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“California’s environmental justice and equity movement is 
establishing a blueprint for the nation and world.”
California Air Resources Board, California’s
2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan: The 
Strategy for Achieving California’s 2030 
Greenhouse Gas Target ES-6 (Nov. 2017)
INTRODUCTION
As the federal role in addressing climate change shrinks, state and local 
action is once again taking center stage.  States are facing innumerable
challenging policy questions about the best mechanisms for addressing
climate and energy, and many are looking to California for inspiration.
Although California’s comprehensive climate policies have long received 
national attention for their economy-wide approach and the state’s multiplicity of
climate initiatives, less attention has been focused on the numerous laws and 
policies explicitly addressing the relationship between disadvantaged populations
and the state’s climate and energy policies.  As decisionmakers grapple with
the fundamental and existential shifts associated with a clean energy transition,
California’s efforts to incorporate environmental justice—and the state’s broader
social, economic, and environmental vision–provide important insights about 
the potential for comprehensive climate initiatives in other states.
California’s 2006 landmark Global Warming Solutions Act established the
broad contours of the state’s climate change policies, and included numerous
specific references to maximizing co-pollutant reductions and enhancing
environmental and economic benefits for disadvantaged communities.  
Specific legislation has directed cap-and-trade auction revenue to disadvantaged
communities, targeted renewable energy development on affordable housing, 
and instantiated mechanisms to enhance public participation.
At the same time, the state has embarked on some pathways, like cap­
and-trade, long resisted by environmental justice advocates.  As a result, 
environmental justice leaders are skeptical that the state has lived up to 
the laws’ environmental justice objectives.1 Recent legislative initiatives
on climate targets and cap-and-trade have featured bruising battles over 
1. However, California Senator Henry Stern has observed that environmental justice 
advocates “defined the terms of the debate even if they don’t feel like the won the debate”).
Tony Barboza & Chris Megerian, Brown Signs Bill Targeting Pollution, L.A. TIMES, at 2
(July 27, 2017). 
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the role environmental justice considerations and local pollution control
efforts should play in state policy. State actors have been caught between
the expectations of environmental justice activists and industry pressures 
for autonomy and low costs. 
Notwithstanding the challenges and trade-offs, however, climate policies 
that link to a broader vision–like alleviating long-standing air pollution or
providing new economic opportunities–present an important model for other 
states as they re-commit to state and regional initiatives in the wake of the 
newly emerging federal vacuum.  Because different states face differing 
socioeconomic challenges, states may well frame and orient their climate 
policies differently. In California, the connection to co-pollutant emissions 
and access to opportunities has brought environmental justice issues to the 
fore.  In other states, different concerns, like the fate of newly unemployed
fossil fuel workers or opportunities for rural rust belt communities, could 
provide the comprehensive frame that ties GHG reduction efforts to a just
and sustainable clean economy transition.  The California story provides 
a snapshot that could inspire other states’ conceptions of the opportunities 
and challenges inherent in comprehensive climate policies.
Given the multiplicity of California’s numerous policies, this Article provides 
an overview—not a full exploration of all the twists and turns that have 
marked each legislative debate and administrative policy. Moreover, it is too
soon to assess implementation of many recent programs, with expectations
varying widely. Nonetheless, this Article provides a relatively comprehensive 
picture of the most significant policies and highlights the opportunities 
and issues they raise. 
Part I introduces California’s initial climate policies and the important 
role that environmental justice concerns played in garnering a legislative 
majority for the state’s early efforts. Part I then provides an overview of 
the role of environmental justice in the implementation of a wide range of 
climate change mitigation programs and the ways in which the state has 
sought to broadly distribute the benefits of a clean energy transition.2 
Because the state’s cap-and-trade program has been a flash point for
environmental justice concerns, Part I ends by providing further details on
the program’s operation and reviewing recent studies assessing emissions
distributions before and after the program was adopted.
2. Given the multiplicity of initiatives, this Article does not include every single 
legislative or agency action.  In particular, this Article focuses on the major legislative 
initiatives and policy initiatives overseen by the California Air Resources Board and included
in scoping plans for meeting legislatively required GHG reduction targets.  Other agencies, 
including the Public Utilities Commission, the California Energy Commission, the Strategic
Growth Council, the Governor’s Office, and more, have established policies likely to reduce
GHG emissions as well. 
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Part II highlights major recent legislative developments: in 2016, setting an
emissions target of 40 percent below 1990 emissions by 2030, and, in 2017, 
extending the state’s cap-and-trade program.  These legislative accomplishments
featured significant debates about environmental justice and its role in
California’s future climate policy.
Part III crystallizes critical issues and insights that have emerged from
California’s odyssey, insights relevant not only to understanding the California 
experience, but to considering the development of climate policy in other 
states. Part III first highlights the value of California’s multipollutant
approach, its efforts to distribute the benefits of a clean energy transition 
broadly, its attention to economic justice, and mechanisms to enhance
participatory opportunities for historically marginalized communities.  However, 
the commitment to environmental justice concerns has not been unqualified.
Part III analyzes a second issue: how economic and political concerns have
resulted in a relatively “light touch” for industry – a result that, while 
understandable, could dampen emission reductions (and associated co-pollutant
reductions) near industrial sources, and ultimately slow the industrial 
sector’s necessary decarbonization. The third issue highlighted by Part III 
is emerging tension over California’s multipollutant focus, which appeared 
somewhat threatened during administrative and legislative deliberations 
in 2017, but, overall, appears likely to proceed.  Fourth, the 2017 legislation 
featured a politically charged anti-regulatory trend seen in many states:
preemption.  The state’s legislation preempted local controls on stationary 
sources and, in the oil and gas sector, preempted both state and local controls. 
The preemption could complicate integrated controls for GHG and co-
pollutant emissions and reflects the sophisticated way in which regulated
entities, particularly in the oil and gas sector, have leveraged their political
power. 
This Article concludes by illuminating the value of linking climate policy
to a broader vision that addresses day-to-day environmental, social, and 
economic vulnerabilities.  Even if the environmental justice frame itself 
lacks traction in other states, a comprehensive vision, however framed, could 
help garner the political support necessary to counter the strong vested
interests arrayed against a change in the status quo.
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I. THE ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
 
JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA CLIMATE LAW
 
A. The Role of Environmental Justice in California’s First 

Comprehensive Climate Initiative, AB 32 

California’s two decades of climate action have been punctuated by several 
major greenhouse gas initiatives and many more diverse energy, environmental, 
and greenhouse gas bills addressing particular sectors or issues.  In 2006,
the state enacted its first cross-cutting and major climate law, the Global 
Warming Solutions Act, often referred to by its bill number: AB 32.3  AB
32 established an initial GHG target: 1990 levels by 2020, estimated to be 
15 percent below 2005 emissions and 30 percent below anticipated 2020
emissions.4  The law did not specify how the state should reach its target.
Instead, it established a comprehensive planning process, coordinated by
the California Air Resources Board (CARB), to evaluate reduction opportunities 
across all sectors of the state and incorporate requirements from the multiple 
climate initiatives passed by the Legislature and initiated by California 
agencies both before and after AB 32.5 
California environmental justice groups played a critical role in garnering 
a legislative majority for AB 32. Democratic lawmakers representing poor 
communities of color recognized that the state’s climate initiatives could
have immediate and significant benefits for poor communities enduring a 
disproportionate environmental burden from the state’s consumption of 
fossil fuels.6  Poor communities of color are disproportionately concentrated
near many of the states’ most intensive air pollution sources, including large
 3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (2006). 
4. Id. at § 38550 (describing 1990 goal); CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE
SCOPING PLAN, at ES-1 (2008) [hereinafter INITIAL SCOPING PLAN] (explaining percentage
reductions from current and projected business-as-usual emissions), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/86XG-C4F3].
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561; see INITIAL SCOPING PLAN, supra note 
4, at ES-1.
 6. See generally Julie Sze et al., Best in Show? Climate and Environmental Justice 
Policy in California, 2 ENVTL. JUSTICE 179, 180–83 (2009); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change 
and Environmental Justice: Lessons from the California Lawsuits, 5 SAN DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE
& ENERGY L. 1, 4 (2014) [hereinafter Kaswan, Lessons].
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stationary sources,7 freeways,8 and sea ports generating significant pollution 
from ships and trucks.9 Because GHG emissions are often strongly correlated 
with the traditional air pollutants that threaten public health, GHG reductions
could lead to air quality benefits.10 
As a condition for supporting the legislation, key lawmakers and
environmental groups backed provisions designed to achieve multiple benefits, 
including environmental justice.  AB 32 included provisions addressing
air quality, economic benefits for disadvantaged communities, and opportunities 
for participation.11  The law explicitly states that the California Air Resources
Board (CARB), the agency responsible for implementing the law, must 
develop an approach that, among other things, “maximizes additional 
environmental and economic co-benefits for California, and complements 
7. See CAL. EPA, OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT (OEHHA),
TRACKING AND EVALUATION OF BENEFITS AND IMPACTS OF GREENHOUSE GAS LIMITS IN 
DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES: INITIAL REPORT 14–17 (Feb. 2017), https://oehha.ca.gov/
media/downloads/environmental-justice/report/oehhaab32report020217.pdf [https://perma.
cc/KM3U-L4GK]. More than fifty percent of all sources, except cogeneration, are within 
a mile of a “disadvantaged community,” id. at 16, while only 25 percent of the state’s 
census tracts are considered disadvantaged, id. at 14. 
8. See Tegan K. Boehmer et al., Residential Proximity to Major Highways – United
States, 2010, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 46, 46 (Nov. 22, 2013 Supplement),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6203a8.htm [https://perma.cc/C3XA­
62TN.
 9. See, e.g., Tony Barboza, L.A., Long Beach Ports Adopt Plan to Slash Air Pollution
and Go Zero-Emissions, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017) (describing the port complex as the 
single largest source of air pollution in Southern California).
 10. See JAMES K. BOYCE & MANUEL PASTOR, COOLING THE PLANET, CLEARING THE
AIR: CLIMATE POLICY, CARBON PRICING, AND CO-BENEFITS (2012) (analyzing the relationship 
between co-pollutant and GHG emissions), https://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/ published 
_study/Cooling_the_Planet_Sept2012-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWX9-6JHD]. The correlation
is not absolute; industries vary. Boyce and Pastor find that power plants have a high ratio 
of GHG emissions to traditional pollutants. In contrast, refineries’ GHG and co-pollutant 
emissions are closely tracked–at least in volume, if not in source.  Id. at viii. CARB has 
found that, in California, most industrial GHG emissions stem from combustion, so measures
to reduce industrial combustion of fossil fuels would reduce associated co-pollutant emissions. 
CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN: THE STRATEGY FOR
ACHIEVING CALIFORNIA’S 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS TARGET 1, 69 (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter
NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN], https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_ 
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GF3-VMN7]. Some co-pollutant emissions are, however,
process-related, and are less likely to be reduced by GHG-reduction efforts. Id. at 70. 
11. See Sze et al., supra note 6, at 179–81. A number of traditional environmental
groups, like the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council,
joined forces with environmental justice groups to back the environmental justice provisions. 
Id.
 89


















    
  
    
    
    
 






   








the state’s efforts to improve air quality.”12  The law further states that CARB 
must “[e]nsure that the activities undertaken to comply with [its] regulations
do not disproportionately impact low-income communities.”13 
Recognizing that a transition to clean energy and reduced GHG emissions 
would generate new economic opportunities, the law also provides that 
CARB “direct public and private investment toward the most disadvantaged
communities in California.”14 From a participatory standpoint, the bill created
an “Environmental Justice Advisory Committee,” composed of members
of community groups from around the state, to provide focused analysis 
and advice on AB 32’s implementation.15  In addition, the law requires CARB
to hold public workshops on the scoping plan in polluted and disadvantaged
communities.16 
During the initial legislative deliberations over AB 32, the inclusion or 
exclusion of cap-and-trade proved a contentious issue, and, as discussed 
below, has continued to be a flash point.  Republican Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger hoped legislators would explicitly include cap-and-trade 
as a central policy mechanism in the bill.17  Environmental justice groups
opposed its inclusion based on long-standing skepticism and concern 
about the operation of cap-and-trade programs.18  Given experience with
a troubled Los Angeles cap-and-trade program, RECLAIM, and problems 
with Europe’s GHG trading program, the Emissions Trading Scheme
 12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(h). The full text of the provision states 
that CARB is to adopt an approach that “minimizes costs and maximizes benefits for 
California’s economy, improves and modernizes California’s energy infrastructure and
maintains electric system reliability, maximizes additional environmental and economic
co-benefits for California, and complements the state’s efforts to improve air quality.” Id.
AB 32 also states that CARB is to “[c]onsider overall societal benefits, including reductions in
other air pollutants, diversification of energy sources, and other benefits to the economy,
environment, and public health.”  Id. at § 38562(b)(6). More specifically, AB 32 emphasizes
the importance of undertaking activities that complement “efforts to achieve and maintain 
federal and state ambient air quality standards and to reduce toxic air contaminant emissions.” Id.
at § 38562(b)(4). 
13. Id. at § 38562(b)(2). 
14. Id. at § 38565. 
15. Id. at § 38591(a). 
16. Id. at § 38561(g). 
17. See Sze et al., supra note 6, at 183. 
18. See EJ Matters, The California Environmental Justice Movement’s Declaration
on Use of Carbon Trading Schemes to Address Climate Change[hereinafter EJ Movement 
Declaration], http://www.ejmatters.org/docs/CA_EJ_Declaration_on_Carbon_Trading.pdf;
EJ Matters, The Cap and Trade Charade for Climate Change [hereinafter The Cap and 
Trade Charade], http://www.ejmatters.org/docs/Cap-Trade_FACTSHEET.pdf.  See also
Envtl. Justice Advisory Comm., Recommendations and Comments of the Environmental 
Justice Advisory Committee on the Implementation of the Global Warming Solutions Act
of 2006 (AB 32) on the Proposed Scoping Plan 1, 18–21 (Dec. 2008), https://www.arb. 
ca.gov/cc/ejac/ejac_comments_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAN7-8Q67].
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(ETS), environmental justice advocates were skeptical that cap-and-trade 
would reduce GHGs.19 For example, at least in its early years, the RECLAIM 
program failed to reduce emissions,20 failed to prompt investments in 
pollution control,21 and was plagued by poor emissions information that
undermined performance.22 
In addition, because cap-and-trade programs allow companies to determine 
their own emissions, environmental justice groups were concerned that 
industries in disadvantaged communities would continue to emit GHGs 
and associated co-pollutants, purchasing allowances rather than reducing
emissions.  As a consequence, even though GHG emissions might go down
in some places, they might not go down in the state’s most polluted areas.23 
And industry autonomy to make its own emission choices means that 
surrounding communities and government agencies have less input on
emissions choices than is the case in more traditional regulatory programs.24
 19. See Richard T. Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los 
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FORUM 231, 
251–68 (1999) (describing wide-ranging environmental justice critiques of Los Angeles’ 
RECLAIM trading program); Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate 
Change Policy, ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10295–98 (2008) (describing efficacy concerns); 
Kaswan, Lessons, supra note 6, at 35–41 (discussing environmental justice movement’s 
efficacy concerns); Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade:
Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 411–12 (discussing the ETS’
challenges); The Cap and Trade Charade, supra note 18, at 1–3 (describing failure of the 
European ETS).
20. Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory Agency 
in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 291 (2007) (describing RECLAIM’s failure
to reduce emissions in its early years).
21. See Kaswan, supra note 19, at 10296–97 (discussing circumstances in which
cap-and-trade could fail to induce innovation and providing examples from the ETS and 
RECLAIM trading programs); McAllister, supra note 20, at 291–93; Drury et al., supra note
19, at 277. 
22. For example, marine terminals purchasing allowances reportedly underestimated
their emissions, and under-purchased allowances—by many orders of magnitude—thereby
failing to account for their actual emissions. See Drury et al., supra note 19, at 259–60 (stating 
that, according to one analysis, marine terminal emissions were from 10 to 1000 times greater
than the facilities had projected).
23. See The Cap-and-Trade Charade, supra note 18, at 4–5 (discussing hot spot risk in 
connection with Los Angeles’ RECLAIM trading program); Kaswan, Lessons, supra note 6,
at 24–29. 
24. See Envtl. Justice Advisory Comm.,  The California Environmental Justice Movement’s
Declaration in Support of Carbon Pricing Reform in California (approved Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/meetings/02142017/20170215ca-ej-declaration-on-carbon­
pricing-reform-approved.pdf [https://perma.cc/UxF3-MSZP]  (stating that “carbon trading is 
undemocratic because it allows entrenched polluters, market designers, and commodity traders 
 91





















      
 









In the end, due largely to concerns about environmental justice, AB 32 
did not explicitly include cap-and-trade, leaving the decision about specific 
policy mechanisms to CARB.25  Anticipating that CARB might adopt a
market-based mechanism like cap-and-trade, however, the law stated that, 
before adopting such a program, CARB must “[c]onsider the potential for 
direct, indirect, and cumulative emission impacts from these mechanisms,
including localized impacts in communities that are already adversely impacted
by air pollution.”26  And AB 32 stated that, if CARB chose a market mechanism,
it must be designed “to prevent any increase in the emissions of toxic air 
contaminants or criteria air pollutants.”27 
B. Environmental Justice in the Implementation of California 

Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Policies 

AB 32 thus left the crucial implementation details to the executive branch. 
Governor Schwarzenegger continued to support cap-and-trade, and the 
December 2008 scoping plan, which laid out the state’s initial plans to
reach its 2020 target, included an over-arching cap-and-trade program 
designed to constrain emissions from sources representing 85 percent of
the state’s emissions.28  Although the cap-and-trade program “covers” eighty-
five percent of emissions, many sectors are subject to emission reduction 
strategies in addition to the cap-and-trade program.  In fact, analysts suggest 
that the majority of emission reductions achieved to date have resulted 
from numerous programs affecting the transportation and electricity sectors,
as well as the recession.29 To date, the cap-and-trade program has operated
like a backstop to ensure the cap is met rather than as a significant driver
of reductions.
to determine whether and where to reduce greenhouse gases and co-pollutant emissions without 
allowing impacted communities or governments to participate in those decisions”).
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(a) (stating that CARB “may” (not must)
develop “market-based compliance mechanisms”).
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b)(1) (2007). 
27. Id. at (b)(2).
28. INITIAL SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 30–38.  In the Scoping Plan to meet the 
state’s 2030 target, CARB states that the cap-and-trade program will cover 80 percent of
the state’s emissions. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at ES 16. 
29.  According to Chris Busch, “California’s suite of performance standards—such
as efficiency standards for buildings and appliances, the renewable electricity standard for
utilities, and the low carbon fuel standard for transportation fuels—are principally responsible 
for falling emissions”—not the cap-and-trade system.  Chris Busch, Comment: California’s 
Cap-and-Trade Program—the Crisis that Wasn’t, CARBON PULSE (Aug. 2, 2016), http:// 
carbon-pulse.com/22969/ [https://perma.cc/TE7S-EZVQ]. 
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1. Electricity Sector 
In the electricity sector, California has promoted renewable energy and 
energy efficiency for decades.  In 1998, the California Energy Commission 
established its Renewable Energy Program,30 and, by 2015, the state’s
Renewable Portfolio Standard had increased to fifty percent renewables
by 2030.31 The state’s track record in consumer energy efficiency traces
back to the 1970s, when the state initiated extensive appliance and building 
efficiency programs that have continued to evolve.32 Most recently, in 
2015, the state committed to increasing energy efficiency yet another fifty
percent beyond current levels by 2030.33  In 2006, the same year the state 
adopted AB 32, the legislature effectively prohibited new reliance on
coal-fired power by adopting an “electricity performance standard” that
precludes supplying electricity from sources emitting more than state-of­
the-art natural gas facilities.34 
Environmental justice groups have strongly advocated for increasing 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, and associated decreasing reliance 
on fossil fuels, based on both climate and air pollution control objectives.
In fact, they have advocated 100 percent renewable energy by 2030,35 well 
beyond the state’s commitment to fifty percent renewables, and propose 
numerous aggressive energy efficiency measures, many with assistance
 30. See Cal. Energy Comm’n, History of California’s Renewable Energy Programs, 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/history.html [https://perma.cc/9Y7K-NQE6] (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
31. See Cal. Energy Comm’n, Renewable Portfolio Standards, http://www.energy. 
ca.gov/portfolio/ [https://perma.cc/VXN8-9PQ7 (last visited Aug. 11, 2017). The 50 percent
renewables by 2030 goal was established by SB 350 in 2015. See S.B. 350, Stats. 2015, ch. 547, 
§ 20 (Cal. 2015); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15(b)(2)B) (2016).
32. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, REGULATION ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A PRIMER ON 
THE CPUC’S ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS (2016), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploaded 
Files/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/News_Room/Fact_Sheets/English/Regulating%20
Energy%20Efficiency%200216.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD3Z-CXD7].
33. S.B. 350, supra note 31, § 6; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25301(c)(1) (West 2016). 
34. Cal. Energy Comm’n, SB 1368 Emission Performance Standards, http://www. 
energy.ca.gov/emission_standards/ [https://perma.cc/ETR6-V3SF] (last visited Aug. 12, 
2017) (describing SB 1368 limits on high-carbon generation); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(d)
(West 2008).
35. See Envtl. Justice Advisory Comm., Recommendations for Proposed 2030 Target 
Scoping Plan Update, at 7 (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/ejac_recommendations
_proposed_plan122216.pdf [https://perma.cc/T38K-JBL3] (Recommendation #1 in Energy
section). 
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for disadvantaged areas.36  In addition to overarching RPS and energy
efficiency requirements, they have also advocated for specific limits on 
all large emissions sources, including energy-generation facilities.37 The
state has not adopted this approach, instead relying on general RPS
and efficiency goals, coupled with the cap-and-trade program, to reduce 
electricity-source emissions.  The only law directly addressing electricity
source emissions in vulnerable communities is AB 1937, adopted in 2016, 
which discourages new natural gas facilities in communities suffering 
from cumulative environmental burdens.38 
2. Transportation Sector 
In the transportation sector, in 2002, California required CARB to develop 
GHG vehicle emission standards,39 which CARB promulgated in 2004.40 
Under the Obama Administration, California and the federal government 
integrated GHG emission standards, an integration manifested in California’s
“Advanced Clean Cars” program, adopted in 2012.41  Recognizing significant
emissions from freight transport, the state has developed a Sustainable Freight 
Action Plan for more sustainable freight and goods movement, including
a commitment to zero and low-emission vehicles and equipment.42  Relatedly,
the state has, over many years, developed strong rules to control diesel 
particulates that are anticipated to have significant GHG reduction benefits,43
 36. Id. at 8–9 (Recommendations 14–19 in the Energy section). 
37. Id. at 5 (Recommendation 4 in the Industry section). 
38. A.B. 1937, Stats. 2016, ch. 664 (Cal. 2016). The law states that, when electrical 
corporations solicit bids for new gas-fired generating units, they should seek bids that are 
not in communities burdened by pollution.
39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2003) (added by Stat. 2002, ch. 200). 
40. See CAL. AIR. RES. BD., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/grnhsgas/grnhsgas.htm [https://perma.cc/FC2U-XPK] (last visited
Oct. 23, 2017). 
41. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Advanced Clean Cars Program, https://www.arb.ca.gov/
msprog/acc/acc.htm [https://perma.cc/M3B5-HVNA] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017). 
42. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Sustainable Freight Transport, https://www.arb.ca.gov/
gmp/sfti/sfti.htm [https://perma.cc/P2SY-4DNQ] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); CAL. DEP’T 
OF TRANSP. ET AL., CALIFORNIA SUSTAINABLE FREIGHT ACTION PLAN (2016), http://www.
dot.ca.gov/hq/tpp/offices/ogm/cs_freight_action_plan/Documents/CSFAP_Main%20Doc
ument_FINAL_07272016.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6WH-QL59].  The Plan emerged from
a 2015 Executive Order, EO B-32015, from Gov. Jerry Brown.  Id. at 1. 
43. Diesel particulates are a source of “black carbon,” a potent short-lived climate 
pollutant.  To meet air quality objectives, California adopted stringent diesel particulate 
requirements for trucks in 2000 as part of its Diesel Risk Reduction Plan, which required 
an 85 percent reduction in diesel particulates by 2020.  CAL. AIR RES. BD., SHORT-LIVED 
CLIMATE POLLUTANT REDUCTION STRATEGY [hereinafter SLCP], at 48 (2017). The plan
not only imposes limitations on new trucks, it also includes “in-use” performance standards that
require measures to reduce emissions from existing trucks. Id.  Since 2005, CARB credits 
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and to dramatically reduce exposures near ports and along freight corridors 
to the benefit of neighboring disadvantaged communities.44 
On the fuel side, CARB developed a low-carbon fuel standard to reduce 
the carbon intensity of the state’s transportation fuels.45  However, a 2015 
effort to establish a statewide goal of reducing oil consumption by fifty
percent by 2030 failed to pass in the face of vehement oil industry opposition 
that arguably influenced legislative votes.46 
Recognizing that transportation emissions are also affected by “vehicle 
miles traveled” (VMT)—by how much people drive—the state enacted
SB 375, the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008, 
which required CARB to establish 2020 and 2035 regional GHG reduction 
targets for the state’s large metropolitan areas.47  Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations, the entities historically responsible for transportation planning,
were then required to develop “Sustainable Communities Strategies” (SCS) 
that would orient housing, transportation, and land use patterns to achieve 
the regional reduction goal.48 All of these measures are likely to offer
significant co-pollutant reduction benefits.  Because the SCS strategies must
address regional housing needs for all segments of the population, they
the diesel reduction plan with reducing diesel particulates at ports by 70 percent and at the
highest risk rail-yards by 50 to 70 percent. Id. at 49. 
44. CARB notes that “[m]any of the sources and sectors responsible for SLCP 
emissions are concentrated in communities with high levels of pollution or unemployment,
which could especially benefits from targeted investments to improve public health and
improve public health.”  SLCP, supra note 43, at 3–4.  Although the SLCP Reduction Strategy
includes numerous provisions, including methane in agricultural, landfill, and oil and gas 
settings, the black carbon controls on diesel particulates are key to the strategy’s public health 
benefits. 
45. 17 CAL. CODE. REG. § 95480 et seq.
46. Dan Morain, How Oil Won the Battle for SB 350, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 12,
2015), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/dan-morain/article34976295.html 
[https://perma.cc/4YN7-J2ED]. 
47. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65080(b)(2)(A) (West 2018). 
48. Id. at (2)(B). Local governments are not required to conform their land use plans 
to the Sustainable Communities Strategy (SCS).  Id. at § 65060.8; see Dorothy J. Glancy, 
Vehicle Miles Traveled and Sustainable Communities, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23, 47–48
(2014).  Nonetheless, the planning process provided a forum for regional communication 
and planning that could prompt initiatives even if they are not mandatory.  In addition, the 
law provides exemptions from the California Environmental Quality Act, California’s 
environmental assessment law, for projects consistent with the regional SCSs, see Glancy,
supra, at 43, 46–47 (2014), and transportation funding will be available only for projects 
conforming to the Metropolitan Planning Organization’s SCS, id. at 46. These features could 
increase compliance with SCSs even if they are not legally binding. 
 95
KASWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2018 2:23 PM     
 
 












   
 





   
 
   
   
  
  
      
  
provide a vehicle (so to speak) for integrating land use, affordable housing, 
transportation, and environmental concerns.49 
3. Agricultural Sector 
California has also grappled with methane emissions from the agricultural 
and food sectors. Although shorter-lived than carbon, methane’s global
warming potential—its “greenhouse” effect, is around 80 times that of
carbon.50 CARB’s Short-Lived Climate Pollutant Reduction Strategy outlines
strategies and goals for reducing methane emissions from landfills and for
converting landfill and manure emissions to useable energy.51  In 2016, 
the California Legislature stepped in with legislation that codified and shaped
the strategy.52  To the frustration of environmental justice and other advocates,
the legislation weakened CARB’s goals for the dairy industry, delaying 
the first firm requirements until 2024.53  Nonetheless, through a variety of
measures in food, agriculture, and other sectors, the state remained committed 
to reducing methane emissions by forty percent below 2013 levels by
2030.54 
4. Industrial Sector 
The state has fewer direct regulatory initiatives to control industry sector
emissions than in the electricity and transportation sectors.  California’s 
industrial sector includes refineries, oil and gas drilling and transport, 
computer technologies, aerospace, cement plants, food processing, and 
other manufacturing.55  Carbon emissions come from on-site combustion 
to provide energy for industrial facilities, as well as from industrial process­
49. See generally  INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, UNDERSTANDING S.B. 375: REGIONAL
PLANNING FOR TRANSPORTATION, HOUSING, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, at 13 (2011) http://www.
ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/resources__Understanding_SB_375_Regional_
Planning_Guide_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2AJ-VPZ5]. 
50. SLCP, supra note 43, at 42. 
51. Id. at 61–77. 
52. S.B. 1383, Stat. 2016, ch. 395, (Cal. 2016). SB 1383 provided substantial specific 
direction to the SLCP Strategy.
53. See Sarah Duffy, Revised SLCP Strategy Demonstrates the Impact of SB 1383,
LEGAL PLANET BLOG (Dec. 5, 2016), http://legal-planet.org/2016/12/05/revised-slcp-strategy­
demonstrates-the-impact-of-sb-1383/ [https://perma.cc/XCT5-9HKU]; Cal. Env’l Justice 
Alliance, Environmental Justice Wins in the 2016 Legislative Session, http://caleja.org/
2016/09/environmental-justice-in-the-2016-legislative-session/ [https://perma.cc/37LA­
RGCD] (last Visited Feb. 4, 2018) (noting that the dairy industry had weakened regulatory
measures). 
 54. S.B. 1383, supra note 52, at § 2 (adding CAL.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39730.5(a)). 
55. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 69. 
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based emissions.56 An early strategy required large facilities to conduct energy
efficiency audits and identify potential co-pollutant reduction benefits.57 
The audits have been completed, and, according to CARB, most of the
identified and feasible energy efficiency measures that would generate co-
pollutant benefits have already been completed or are on-going.58 
The state’s Short-Lived Climate Pollutant Reduction Strategy59 has also
led to new controls on methane emissions from oil and gas production, 
distribution, and storage that are intended to reduce methane emissions
from oil and gas wells and associated infrastructure by 40 to 45 percent
by 2025.60 For other industrial sources of methane and black carbon (in 
the form of particulates), the strategy is relying upon cap-and-trade and 
other programs to create market signals to incentivize efficiency, as well
as on local state implementation planning processes to control criteria air
pollutants.61  As the state works to dramatically reduce on-road mobile sources 
of black carbon, the strategy anticipates that, by 2030, fuel combustion
and industry will represent an increasing percentage of remaining black 
carbon emissions.62 In other words, black carbon from fuel combustion and
industry will be less controlled relative to other sources.
Overall, the primary constraint on industry emissions is the cap-and­
trade program.  It is telling that CARB’s web pages devoted to specific
sectors put “cap-and-trade and industry” together as one web page, in contrast 
to other sectors, which have web pages devoted to their sector-specific
 56. See id. (noting that industrial sector GHG emissions primarily result from fuel 
combustion, but also include some process-related emissions). 
57. See INITIAL SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 54–55; Cal. Air Res. Bd., Energy 
Efficiency and Co-Benefits Assessment for Large Industrial Sources—Regulatory Activities
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/energyaudits/energyaudits.htm [https://perma.cc/
5UCK-WBH5]. 
58. See CAL. AIR RES. BD. & CAL. EPA, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CO-BENEFITS
ASSESSMENT PUBLIC REPORTS WORKSHOP (June 30, 2015), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/energy
audits/meetings/063015/presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB42-E4P2]  (PowerPoint presentation).
Although CARB indicated it would complete an “ARB Findings Report” documenting the 
results of the industry reports and third-party assessments of them, see id. at 31, the report 
does not appear on the agency website (which, as of this writing, has not been updated
since Nov. 3, 2015), Cal. Air Res. Bd., Energy Efficiency and Co-Benefits Assessment for 
Large Industrial Sources—Regulatory Activities (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). 
59. SLCP, supra note 43, at 56.
60.  17 Cal. Code Reg. § 95665. 
61. SLCP, supra note 43, at 51. 
62. Id. at 53 (noting that, in 2030, fuel combustion and industry are expected to 
contribute 24 percent of black carbon emissions). 
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strategies.63 The cap-and-trade program affects industries in two ways:
they must hold allowances to cover their direct emissions from on-site fuel
combustion and industrial processes.  In addition, to the degree they utilize
fuels on site, the cost of the fuels incorporates the effect of the cap-and­
trade program on fuel distributors, which must hold carbon allowances for
the carbon content of the fuels they distribute. Given the centrality of
environmental justice concerns about cap-and-trade and its role in debates 
about the future contours of California’s climate program, the topic is 
discussed in more detail below.64 




Environmental justice efforts have also focused on distributing the benefits
of climate reduction efforts to disadvantaged communities. The November
2017 Scoping Plan states that “investments and policies that both lift up 
the poor and reduce wealth disparities will address the multiple problems 
of climate change mitigation, adaptation, and health inequities.”65  It states
further that “[i]t is critical that communities of color, low-income communities,
or both, receive the benefits of the cleaner economy growing in California, 
including its environmental and economic benefits.”66 
Cap-and-trade revenue has provided the opportunity for significant 
benefits. In 2012, California legislation required that 25 percent of cap-and­
trade auction revenues from the state’s “Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund” 
(GGRF) be used to benefit disadvantaged communities.67  In 2016, the 
legislature required that more of the funds be used within disadvantaged
communities and required that an additional 10 percent of the funds be used
to benefit low-income households and communities.68  Communities are
 63. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Economic Sectors Portal, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
ghgsectors/ghgsectors.htm [https://perma.cc/4DTL-CH7H] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017). 
64. See infra section I(D). 
65. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 49. 
66. Id. at 15. 
67. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006: Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Fund, S.B. 535, Stat. 2012, ch. 830 (Cal. 2012). Of that 25 percent, 10 was required to be devoted
to projects located within disadvantaged communities. Id.
68. A.B. 1550, ch. 369, (Cal. 2016). The 2016 legislation dedicated revenue specifically
for low-income communities based on evidence that some low-income communities 
needing assistance were not classified as “disadvantaged” under the state’s definition. See
Emi Wang, Addressing the Climate Gap: California Legislature Delivers for Frontline
Communities, The Greenlining Institute (Sept. 14, 2016), http://greenlining.org/blog/2016/ 
addressing-climate-gap-california-legislature-delivers-frontline-communities [https://perma.cc/
6N47-DBL3].
As of November 2017, 50 percent of auction proceeds had benefited disadvantaged
communities, and 34 percent were in such communities. See Cal. Climate Investments,
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defined as “disadvantaged” based on “geographic, socioeconomic, public 
health, and environmental hazard criteria,” including disproportionate 
exposures to environmental pollution and concentrations of people with 
low socioeconomic indicators.69  To identify disadvantaged communities, 
California has gathered extensive data and developed a computer program,
CalEnviroScreen, that integrates information into maps that allow policymakers
to overlay multiple characteristics and identify areas experiencing multiple
challenges.70  The communities with scores in the top twenty-five percent, 
as well as certain other low-population but high-pollution communities, 
are considered “disadvantaged.”71 To date, of the 1.2 billion in auction revenue
being implemented in concrete projects, fifty percent benefits disadvantaged 
communities and thirty-four percent is physically located within disadvantaged
communities.72 
Projects eligible for GGRF funds are expected to reduce GHG emissions
in ways that, to the extent feasible, “[m]aximize economic, environmental, 
and public health benefits,” by providing jobs, improving air quality, and 
engaging “businesses, public agencies, nonprofits, and other community
Disadvantaged Communities, http://www.caclimateinvestments.ca.gov/disadvantaged­
communities/ [https://perma.cc/TPC3-RC53] (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). Remaining auction 
revenues are being used for a variety of other purposes. For example, the funding is essential to
the development of the state’s planned high-speed rail, connecting the San Francisco Bay
Area, the Central Valley, and Los Angeles, a project that has already received $800 million 
in auction revenue funding.  See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Auction Proceeds Funded Programs, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auctionproceeds/ggrfprogrampage.htm#Transpor
tation [https://perma.cc/UX3F-L63Q].
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39711.  The 2016 legislation expanding the 
percentage level to 35 percent specified that the state should disburse 10 percent to benefit 
low-income communities that might not meet the full range of criteria.  A.B. 1550, ch. 369,
(Cal. 2016).
70. See Cal. Office of Envtl Health and Hazard Assessment, About CalEnviroScreen, 
https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen [https://perma.cc/RDC9-78PG] (last visited Nov. 10,
2017).
71. See CalEPA, California Climate Investments to Benefit Disadvantaged Communities,
http://calepa.ca.gov/envjustice/ghginvest/ [https://perma.cc/W34R-BFAC] (last visited Nov.
10, 2017).
72. CAL. CLIMATE INVESTMENTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON CALIFORNIA
CLIMATE INVESTMENTS USING CAP-AND-TRADE AUCTION PROCEEDS, at v (Nov. 2017),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auctionproceeds/cci_annual_report_2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K532-M2YY]. Overall, the GGRF has funded 30,000 residential energy efficiency
measures, provided over 100,000 rebates for zero or low-emission vehicles, funded 200
transit projects, and supported over 1000 new affordable housing units. NOVEMBER 2017
SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at ES 17. 
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institutions.”73  Potential projects include improving energy efficiency,
installing distributed energy at universities, public buildings, and industrial 
sites, measures to reduce transportation emissions, funding for sustainable 
infrastructure and waste reduction, and investments in research.74 
Moreover, to provide a more cohesive framework for community
investments and facilitate community-driven planning, in 2016 the state 
passed the “Transformative Climate Communities Program” to facilitate 
community-wide planning in revenue-eligible communities.75  In 2016,  
$140 million of GGRF funds were committed for the “development and 
implementation of neighborhood-level transformative climate community
plans that include multiple, coordinated greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
projects that provide local economic, environmental, and health benefits 
to disadvantaged communities. . .”76  The program supports and enables
integrated and bottom-up community-based planning. 
Additional laws have sought to enhance renewable energy development 
in disadvantaged communities.  A law that encourages utility investment
in renewable energy explicitly states that utilities should “give preference to
renewable energy projects that provide environmental and economic benefits 
to communities afflicted with poverty or high unemployment, or that suffer
from high emission levels of toxic air contaminants, criteria air pollutants,
and greenhouse gases.”77  To address disparities in the distribution of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency investments, the most recent RPS legislation,
SB 350, ordered a study of potential obstacles in and opportunities for
these investments in low-income communities (the Barriers Study).78  The
November Scoping Plan states that it will “implement the recommendations 
of the Barriers Study for increasing access to renewable energy generation 
for low-income customers, energy efficiency and weatherization investments
for low-income customers, and contracting opportunities for local small
business in disadvantaged communities.”79  More broadly, SB 350 encouraged
the relevant state agencies to take a multi- pollutant approach in considering
energy choices, seeking technologies that would have the lowest possible
 73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39712(b) (Westlaw 2018).
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39712(c) (Westlaw 2018).
75. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 75240 (Westlaw 2018). 
76. Id. at § 75240. CALIFORNIA STRATEGIC GROWTH COUNCIL, Transformative Climate 
Communities (TCC) (2016) http://sgc.ca.gov/programs/tcc/vision/ [https://perma.cc/GG32­
76LE]. 
77. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13 (codifying SB 43, enacted in 2013). 
78. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25327 (codifying the study provision in SB 350, the 
2015 legislation that established California’s 50 percent RPS standard). 
79. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 68. 
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“emissions of greenhouse gases, criteria pollutants, and toxic air 
contaminants onsite.”80 
The 2015 “Multifamily Affordable Housing Solar Roofs Program”
dedicates up to one billion dollars, over 10 years, to installing solar power 
on multi-family apartment buildings for low-income tenants.  The funds 
are expected to lower utility bills for 200,000 low-income apartments.81 
And to reduce the risk that solar arrays will increase property values, leading 
to gentrification, the law authorizes the agency to require covenants and
deed restrictions to ensure that the property continues to be rented to low-
income residents.82 The law explicitly integrates economic development,
renewable energy, and GHG reduction goals.83 
The state has also worked to provide disadvantaged communities with
the benefits of low-emission transportation options that reduce greenhouse 
gas and co-pollutant emissions.  In 2015, the legislature enacted SB 1275, 
the “Charge Ahead California Initiative,” to direct the benefits of the 
state’s on-going zero- and low-emission vehicle programs to low-income 
and environmentally stressed communities.84  In addition to establishing 
an overarching goal of placing 1 million zero- and near zero-emission
vehicles onto California roads by 2023, the bill explicitly stated its goal 
“to increase access for disadvantaged, low-income, and moderate-income
communities and consumers . . . to enhance air quality, lower greenhouse 
gases, and promote overall benefits for those communities and consumers.”85 
With the benefit of funds from GHG auction revenue, CARB’s Clean
Vehicle Rebate Program has increasingly focused on rebates for low-income
consumers, with all rebates to be reserved for low-income consumers
 80. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 400(b).
81. CAL. PUB. UTIL.CODE § 2870(c). Funding for this program stems from the allowance 
allocation process.  CARB issues allowances to utilities for free, but requires them to use
the proceeds for rate-payer benefit, including clean energy. Id. at § 748.5(c). 
82. Id. at § 2870(f)(2). 
83.  See id. (stating that: “[i]nstalling . . . solar energy systems in disadvantaged
communities can provide local economic development benefits while advancing the state’s 
renewable energy policies and policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”). A.B. 693, 
Stat. 2015, ch. 582, § 1(c) (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.
xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB693 [https://perma.cc/58HY-G7PN] (legislative findings). 
84. S.B. 1275, Stat. 2014, ch. 530 (Cal. 2014). The Charge Ahead Program built on
earlier legislation providing resources to help low-income consumers (as well as other consumers)
retire and replace high-polluting cars and trucks. See A.B. 8, Stat. 2013, ch. 401 (Cal. 2013). 
85. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44258.4(b). 
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beginning in late 2016.86  In addition to vehicle rebates, SB 1275 further
directed CARB to establish programs to facilitate access to electric transportation, 
including financing mechanisms (in addition to the rebates), car-sharing 
programs, and “[d]eployment of charging infrastructure in multiunit dwellings 
in disadvantaged communities.”  The bill’s legislative findings clearly intertwined 
the state’s twin concerns about greenhouse gas emissions and on-going
pollution in disadvantaged communities.87 
As the foregoing description of California’s legislative initiatives suggests, 
California has adopted a dizzying array of policies to reduce emissions
and to spread the benefits of climate change actions. Before addressing
the recent legislation shaping the future of California’s climate policy and 
analyzing the environmental justice features and implications of these
measures, however, a few additional words on the state’s cap-and trade
program are warranted.
D. Environmental Justice Flashpoint: The Cap-and-Trade Program
1. The Cap-and-Trade Program 
Controversy over cap-and-trade has marked the implementation of AB 
32 and been central to debates about the state’s future trajectory.  Industry has 
supported cap-and-trade as the most cost-effective reduction strategy.88 
At the same time, as discussed above, environmental justice advocates
have been concerned about its efficacy in reducing GHG emissions, its capacity
to deliver associated co-pollutant benefits where they are most needed, 
and the lack of democratic participation in industry emission decisions.89
 86. See Rob Nikolewski, California tweaks electric car rebates: Will it work?, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sd­
fi-rebates-changed-20161025-story.html [https://perma.cc/J5FF-43JR]; Cal. Air Resc. Bd., 
Clean Vehicle Rebate Project, https://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/aqip/cvrp.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
QUP5-HSVB].
87. The legislature found that over 40 percent of California residents live close to
“busy roadways and . . . may be exposed to an elevated risk of air pollution and health
impacts.”  S.B. 1275, § 1(a).  The legislature also observed that “[c]ars and trucks are the 
single largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in California . . . [and] the largest
contributor to air pollution that harms public health.” Id. at § 1(d). It further found that 
“California’s low-income and disadvantaged populations continue to face disproportionate 
impacts from substandard air quality.” Id. at § 1(b). 
88. See The Climate v. Local Pollution, L.A. TIMES, at 19 (July 2, 2017). Melanie 
Mason et al., The Environment, Cool Reception: Progressives, Environmentalists are
Ambivalent on Cap-Trade Plan, L.A. TIMES, at 1 (July 12, 2017). 
89. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
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In its initial phase, from 2012-2015, California’s cap-and-trade program 
applied to large energy and industrial sources.90  Beginning in 2015, the
program was extended to entities, like natural gas providers and refineries,
that bring transportation, industrial and heating fuels into commerce.91 
Covered entities must demonstrate that they are holding sufficient allowances
or “offsets” to cover their emissions during the preceding three years.92 
Allowance allocation and offsets provisions have been controversial.
Initially, CARB distributed most, but not all, of the allowances for free.93 
In the industrial sector, CARB provided free allowances because it feared
that requiring certain industries to purchase allowances would result in 
“leakage:” industries would shift production outside of California, hurting the
economy and defeating the state’s emission reduction objectives.94  In the
electricity sector, CARB provided free allowances to utilities and natural gas
suppliers to avoid increasing electricity costs, but required them to use
any value obtained from the allowances for the benefit of ratepayers rather
than shareholders.95 
CARB also adopted an extensive offset program to allow covered entities
to purchase offsets—to pay and get credit for reductions undertaken by 
90. The program covers electricity generating and industrial sources emitting at least 
25,000 metric tons CO2 per year. 17 CAL. CODE REG. § 95812. 
91. INITIAL SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 31. Fuel distributors must hold
allowances to cover the carbon content of the fuels they distribute. All told, the cap-and­
trade program applies to approximately 450 entities. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Overview of ARB
Emissions Trading Program, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade
_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7UL-M93L].
92. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., REGULATORY GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, Chapter 3: What
Does My Company Need To Do to Comply with the Cap-and-Trade Regulation?, at 8 (Apr. 
2013), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/20130419%20Guidance%20Document
%20Ch%203%20posting.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6JH-GSDW] (chart demonstrating triennial 
compliance obligation, with partial compliance in preceding two years and primary compliance in
third year). Emitting facilities are accountable for their direct emissions, while fuels distributors 
are accountable for the carbon content of the fuels they distribute. 
93. See CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE
PROGRAM SUMMARY, at 2 (2014), https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/calif-cap-trade-01-14.pdf. 
94. CAL. AIR. RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA
CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM J-18-21 (APPENDIX J, ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION), https://www. 
arb.ca.gov/regact/ 2010/capandtrade10/capv4appj.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAG9-YMKU]. 
95. 17 CAL. CODE REG. § 95892(d) (allowance allocation for ratepayer benefit
applicable to electric utilities); id. at § 95893(a) (allowance allocation for ratepayer benefit 
applicable to natural gas suppliers). 
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entities outside the program.96 For example, a covered entity could purchase 
forestry offsets that represent the carbon sequestered by a preserved
forest.97 The agency developed the offset program to stimulate reductions
in unregulated sectors and as a cost-containment mechanism, since offsets
could be cheaper to achieve than allowances, and a greater supply of
compliance options would reduce demand for allowances and, accordingly, 
allowance prices.98 Unlimited use of offsets from uncontrolled sectors
could, however, result in few, if any, actual reductions by California sources 
subject to the cap-and-trade program.  Recognizing this risk, the Scoping
Plan limited offset use to no more than 49 percent of the overall reductions 
to be achieved.99  The regulations allow covered entities to use offsets to 
cover eight percent of their overall emissions.100  Because the climate program
as a whole was expected to reduce emissions by around fifteen percent 
from 2005 levels and approximately 30 percent from projected 2020 business- 
as-usual emissions,101 the ability to cover eight percent of all emissions with 
offsets constitutes a significant percentage of the overall anticipated reductions. 
During implementation of AB 32, EJAC and environmental justice groups
continued to strongly oppose cap-and-trade, raising concerns about efficacy
in reducing GHG emissions and the failure to maximize co-pollutant
benefits.102  They argued the state should more directly control GHG emissions
in key industries and do more to guide a clean energy transition.103 They
were also strongly opposed to the allowance allocation and offset provisions. 
By distributing allowances for free, environmental justice advocates believed 
CARB had missed an opportunity to push polluters to pay for their pollution 
by purchasing allowances at allowance auctions.104 And, in addition to
 96. INITIAL SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 36–38; CAL. CODE REG. § 95820(b)
(allowing ARB-issued offsets for compliance); id. at § 95821 (allowing other types of offsets 
for compliance).
97. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROTOCOL: U.S. FOREST PROJECTS
(Nov. 2014).
98. INITIAL SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
99. Id. at 37. The limit to 49 percent derived from principles established by the
Western Climate Initiative, an initiative to develop a western states’ regional cap-and-trade 
program. Id.
 100. CAL. CODE REG. § 95854(b) (identifying “quantitative usage limit” for offsets 
as 0.08).  The regulation restricts the use of sector-based offsets in the first two compliance 
periods to 2.5 percent and expands use of them to 5 percent in the third compliance period. 
Id. at §95854(c). 
101. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
103. See EJAC 2008, supra note 18. 
104. See, e.g., Letter from Tara Marchant, Greenlining Institute, to Mary Nichols, 
Chair, Cal. Air Res. Bd., Econ. and Allocation Advisory Comm. (EAAC) at 2 (Jan. 11, 
2010) (advocating for allowances to be auctioned rather than distributed for free), https:// 
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questioning the degree to which offsets represented legitimate and verifiable
reductions, they feared the offset provisions would reduce pressure on in­
state polluters to reduce emissions, deflating the program’s potential co-
pollutant benefits.105  Since offsets can be purchased from out-of-state providers, 
environmental justice groups were concerned that the benefits of offset 
projects would not accrue to Californians. 
Recognizing AB 32’s explicit limits on increasing pollution in disadvantaged 
communities, CARB adopted an “adaptive management” approach to assess 
whether GHG trading is leading to increasing pollution concentrations.106 The
adaptive management policy requires the state to determine whether emissions 
increases have occurred at covered facilities, determine whether they were
caused by the cap-and-trade program (or, instead, by other economic or 
industry variables), and determine whether the increased emissions will
have a localized adverse effect.107  If so, the policy states that CARB will 
work with local air districts to assess policy options to limit that effect.108 
Initially, environmental justice groups pursued litigation against the
cap-and-trade program.  In 2009, six months after CARB’s approval of 
the Scoping Plan and its inclusion of cap-and-trade, environmental justice
groups brought suit against CARB, arguing that the agency had failed to
sufficiently consider alternative mechanisms for reducing emissions besides 
cap-and-trade and that its analysis of the potential effects of a cap-and­
trade program was inadequate.109  The district court upheld the agency’s
www.arb.ca.gov/lists/dec-14-pdr-ws/119-20100111_gli_comment_ab32_capandtrade.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MSW-AM7D].
105. See Letter from Tara Marchant, supra note 104, at 3; Kaswan, Lessons, supra note
6, at 28–29; Alan Ramo, The California Offsets Game: Who Wins and Who Loses, 20 HASTINGS 
W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 131 (2014). 
106. CAL. AIR RES. BD., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE CAP-AND-TRADE
REGULATION (2011), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/adaptive_management/plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5U2-3NP4]. 
1493 (2012) (describing lawsuit).  The plaintiffs included the Association of Irritated
 107. Id. at 6. 
108. Id. at 27–28. 
109. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 
Residents, California Communities Against Toxics, Coalition for a Safe Environment,
Communities for a Better Environment, Society for Positive Acton, West County Toxics 
Coalition, and several environmental justice activists as individual petitioners.  In addition, 
several environmentalists, sharing environmental justice concerns about the integrity of
offsets, sued CARB over the offset provisions, arguing that the offset protocols did not 
sufficiently guarantee the legitimacy of the emission reductions generating the offsets. See 
Citizens Climate Lobby v. CARB, No. 12-519554 (Cal. Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.acoel.org/ 
file.axd?file=2013%2F1%2FOffset+ruling+1.25.13.pdf.pdf.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7S2­
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analysis of the program’s likely effects.110  However, the court ruled that
CARB had failed to consider alternatives and remanded the plan back to
CARB to further analyze alternative approaches and re-consider and re­
explain its choice to adopt a cap-and-trade program.111  CARB then provided
a supplemental analysis of regulatory options, which the district court 
approved,112 paving the way for the cap-and-trade program’s operation.
Concerns about cap-and-trade also led environmental justice advocates 
and sympathetic legislators to address CARB’s decision-making structure.  In
2015, the state adopted a bill adding two new members to the California 
Air Resources Board, which has ultimate authority over the state’s climate
regulations and strategies.113  The law specifies that the two new members,
appointed by the legislature rather than the governor, should be people “who
work[] directly with communities in the state that are most significantly 
burdened by, and vulnerable to, high levels of pollution, including, but not 
limited to, communities with diverse racial and ethnic populations and 
communities with low-income populations.”114 
2. The Distribution of Emissions 
Given environmental justice concerns about the potential distributional
consequences of cap-and-trade, a critical question has been the effect of 
the state’s climate policies on the distribution of emissions. In light
of the multiplicity of policies in place and the number of variables that
impact emissions decisions, it is difficult to determine cause and effect.
Nonetheless, environmental justice advocates pose a central question: have
the air pollution improvements expected from the state’s climate policies,
including cap-and-trade, materialized in the state’s most impacted 
communities? 
7QUB]. Recognizing the difficult challenges the agency faced, the court upheld CARB’s 
approach to validating offsets. Id. at 33–34. I discuss the lawsuits challenging the scoping
plan’s cap-and-trade program in more detail in Kaswan, Lessons, supra note 6.
110. The district court dismissed the petitioners’ substantive challenges to the Scoping
Plan, Citizens Climate Lobby, supra note 109, at 1493, and the appellate court upheld the 
dismissal of these claims. Id. at 1495–1506. 
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1288 [https://perma.cc/4JMY-CMZZ].
 111. Id.
 112. Id. at 1494. 
113. California Legislative Information, AB-1288 Air resources, http://leginfo.legislature. 
See Liam Dillon, Air Board Focus Shift Urged; Lawmakers Want State Environmental Agency
to Pay More Attention to Low-Income Areas, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2016) (describing 
political backdrop to appointment of environmental justice members to CARB). 
114. Id. (amending HEALTH & SAFETY § 39510(e)). 
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a. Emissions Studies 
As noted above, CARB committed to an adaptive management process 
to assess and respond to potential emissions increases resulting from the 
cap-and-trade program.115  In a November 2016 presentation, the agency
noted that it had identified over eighty environmental justice communities 
potentially impacted by large GHG-emitting facilities.116  Of the ten communities 
initially analyzed, six had maintained or decreased criteria pollutant emissions 
during the first two years of the cap-and-trade program in 2013 and 2014, 
relative to emissions prior to the adoption of the program.117  However,
four of the ten areas—Richmond, Oakland, Fresno, and downtown Los
Angeles—experienced an increase in one or more criteria pollutant
emissions.118  More in-depth analyses have not yet been published. 
Several academic researchers have also studied the environmental justice
implications of the cap-and-trade program.  In A Preliminary Environmental 
Equity Assessment of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program, Prof. Lara 
Cushing and faculty at a range of California universities observed that high-
GHG emitting facilities are disproportionately located in communities of 
color.119  The authors compared PM2.5 emissions in 2011 and 2012, before
the full operation of the cap-and-trade program, with emissions in 2013 and 
2014.  They found that emissions from cement plants, oil and gas production
and supply, and hydrogen plants increased, rather than decreased.120  Even
though overall electricity emissions decreased, emissions from in-state source 
increased slightly.  Utilities appear to have reduced their greenhouse gas 
emissions by reducing reliance on high-carbon out-of-state sources, while 
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
116. Cal. Air Res. Bd., California’s Clean Air Approach and Update on the Cap-
and-Trade Adaptive Management Process, at 25 (Nov. 17, 2016) (power point presentation),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/board/books/2016/111716/16-10-5pres.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF2E­
MB5W].
117. Id. at 24 (displaying the communities with maintained or decreasing emissions,
including Wilmington, Barrio Logan, Brawley, San Bernadino, Bakersfield, and Sacramento). 
118. Id.
119. Lara J. Cushing et al., A Preliminary Environmental Equity Assessment of California’s 
Cap-and-Trade Program, at 2–5 (Sept. 2016), http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/
Climate_Equity_Brief_CA_Cap_and_Trade_Sept2016_FINAL2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7DU­
W9RZ].
120. Id. at 6. See also Cal. Air Res. Bd., California Greenhouse Gas Inventory for 
2000-2015 – by Category as Defined in the 2008 Scoping Plan (last updated June 6, 2017)
(providing data on sectoral emissions), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/tables/
ghg_inventory_scopingplan_sum_2000-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/73CE-R47R].
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maintaining or increasing generation from lower-carbon in-state sources.121 
For refineries, the data indicates that emissions decreased at the median, 
but that the average level of emissions increased,122 suggesting that some 
facilities had large increases while more facilities had small decreases.
Moreover, in 2014, overall refinery emissions increased relative to the years 
preceding the cap-and-trade program.123 
The Cushing study also reported that large facilities used offsets extensively;
the total offset use exceeded the emission reduction expected from 2013 
to 2014.124  The use of these offsets replaced what would otherwise have
been in-sector emission reductions.125  Offset use did not necessarily lead
to increased emissions, but may have reduced the pollution reduction benefits 
of the climate program.  In terms of the potential benefits from offset projects,
other analysts have reported that over seventy-five percent of offset projects 
were located out-of-state.126 
In addition, in early 2017, the California Office of Environmental Health 
Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) released a report entitled Tracking and
Evaluation of Benefits and Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Limits in Disadvantaged
Communities: Initial Report.127 Like the Cushing study, the report documented
the disproportionate location of large GHG and co-pollutant-emitting facilities 
in disadvantaged communities.128 To the extent possible with existing data, 
the report analyzed the correlation between GHG emissions, toxic emissions, 
and criteria pollutants in a number of differing industries and found moderate
to strong correlations for many industries.129  Given facility locations and 
the connection between GHGs and co-pollutants, the study concluded that
changes in GHG emissions, whether from the cap-and-trade program or 
121.  Cushing, et al., supra note 119, at 6. Based on CARB’s 2017 emissions inventory,
which includes data through 2015 (one year past the Cushing study), in-state emissions 
have been essentially constant, hovering around 50 million tons of CO2e per year.  In contrast,
emissions from out-of-state sources have decreased around 10 million tons of CO2e since
the advent of the cap-and-trade program.  California GHG Inventory—by Category, supra
note 120, at 1. 
122. See Cushing, et al., supra note 119, at 6 (Figure 4, indicating median and mean 
levels of refinery emissions before and after initiation of the cap-and-grade program). 
123. See id. at 7 (Figure 5, indicating overall sector emissions in years 2011, 2012, 
2013, and 2014). 
124. Id. at 7–10. 
125. Id. at 8. In addition, 76 percent of the offset projects were out-of-state. Id. 
126. See Rahul Rana, et al., An Impact Analysis of AB 398 on California’s Cap-and-
Trade Market, AM. CARBON REGISTRY (July 2017) (noting that California has provided almost 
one-quarter of the program’s offsets), http://californiacarbon.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
AB398-_Impact_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRW2-WP8L].
127. OEHHA, supra note 7.
 128. Id. at ix.
 129. Id. at 49 (summarizing conclusions); id. at 33–37 (analyzing GHG-toxics correlation); 
id. at 37–40 (analyzing GHG-criteria pollutant correlation). 
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otherwise, and whether GHG increases or decreases, would likely have
a disproportionate effect on disadvantaged communities.130  Except for 
providing maps overlaying two key industries—cement plants and refineries—
with disadvantaged communities,131 the report did not, however, have
sufficient data to analyze specific impacts on disadvantaged communities.132 
Lastly, a draft study by Prof. Kyle Meng has analyzed whether, on average,
emissions have increased or decreased in disadvantaged communities relative 
to advantaged communities.133  The study observed that emissions have
decreased in both kinds of communities, with a possibility of somewhat
greater decrease, on average, in disadvantaged communities.134 However, 
from an environmental justice perspective, shifts in average emissions tell
an important but only a partial story.  Having emissions decrease in one 
community does not compensate for maintained or increased emissions in 
another; averages do not provide assurances of more broadly distributed
benefits. 
Thus, although the state is witnessing a steady decline in GHG emissions,135 
and that decline has improved co-pollutant emissions in some areas, the
state’s program has not, to date, led to dramatic reductions in GHGs
and co-pollutants in some of the state’s most disadvantaged communities. 
That does not mean that the cap-and-trade program has itself caused increases;
a growing economy, low fuel prices, and other factors are likely to be critical
factors as well. But it is also possible that the relatively modest 2020 target, 
coupled with readily available allowances and offsets, has created little 
pressure for actual reductions from at least some industrial sources.
b. CARB Response to Emissions Data 
CARB’s adaptive management process, designed to address potential 
emissions increases, has not yet resulted in concrete action. CARB is engaged
 130. Id. at 49. 
131. Id. at 41 (map overlaying cement plants and disadvantaged communities); id. at
46 (map overlaying refineries and disadvantaged communities).
132. Id. at 48–49. 
133. Kyle C. Meng, Is Cap-and-Trade Causing More Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 
Disadvantaged Communities? (Apr. 2017) (unpublished), http://www.kylemeng.com/research. 
134. Id. at 7. 
135. CAL. AIR RES. BD., 2017 EDITION, CALIFORNIA EMISSIONS INVENTORY: CALIFORNIA















   





     
    
  
   
    
  
      
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
  
    
  
    
 
  
in evaluating community impacts, but, as of November 2017, has not yet 
issued the reports (or actions) originally contemplated by the Adaptive
Management Plan.136  Although CARB does not appear to have officially
renunciated its adaptive management policy, environmental justice
representatives have reported that CARB does not intend to proceed with 
further analysis in light of the progress it expects to achieve by implementing
2017 legislation, AB 617, which requires localized pollution assessment
and controls.137  (AB 617 is discussed further below, in section II(B).) 
Even if CARB were to have made greater progress in the adaptive
management process, it is not clear whether the program would have addressed
fundamental environmental justice concerns.  The adaptive management 
response is triggered only if it can be demonstrated that the GHG trading 
program “caused” an increase.138 Given the multiplicity of factors that can 
determine actual emissions, including economic and population factors, it 
would be difficult to prove that the GHG trading program itself is the 
“cause” of an identified increase.139  Moreover, many environmental justice
communities had hoped that the climate program would not simply maintain 
the status quo, but bring significant co-benefits.  The adaptive management 
process is designed to address only emissions increases, not the lack of
co-pollutant benefits.140 
136. The Adaptive Management Plan indicated that the agency would release annual
reports beginning in December 2012. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 106, at 28. CARB’s 
adaptive management webpage does not refer to or link to any completed reports. See Cal.
Air Res. Bd., Adaptive Management – Localized Air Quality Impacts, https://www.arb.ca.gov/
cc/capandtrade/adaptivemanagement/adaptivemanagement.htm [https://perma.cc/9UBB­
ZYBU] (last reviewed June 14, 2017). The November 2016 presentation indicated CARB’s
intent to release a report in summer 2017. California’s Update on Adaptive Management,
supra note 116, at 28. A July 2017 blog posted by “CALmatters[,] . . . a nonprofit, nonpartisan
media venture” focusing on California politics, reported that an ARB spokesman said that 
the adaptive management “group was moving forward with its work.” HUFFINGTON POST:
CALMATTERS, TRYING TO BREATHE: AS CALIFORNIA TOASTS ENVIRONMENTAL WIN, POLLUTION
STILL PLAGUES (July 31, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trying-to-breatheas-ca­
toasts-environmental-win_us_597f7035e4b07c5ef3dc1731 [https://perma.cc/DGN5-L99R].
An environmental justice activist, Brent Newell of the Center on Race, Poverty & the
Environment, said that CARB was supposed to address pollution increases, but “[t]hey
haven’t.” Id.
137. E-mail communication, Katie Valenzuela Garcia, Principal Consultant, Joint
Legislative Committee on Climate Change Policies (Jan. 2, 2018); Personal communication, 
Amy Vanderwerker, Senior Policy Strategist, California Environmental Justice Alliance
(Feb. 2018). 
138.  Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 106, at 26 (describing the “causation” requirement).
139. Id. (acknowledging multiple factors and difficulty demonstrating causation);
see also Kaswan, Lessons, supra note 6, at 32 (quoting concerns expressed by Alegria de 
la Cruz, Legal Director for the Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment). 
140. Id.
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From an environmental justice perspective, the emissions results to date 
validate earlier fears.  Given maintained or increased emissions in some
disadvantaged urban communities, as well as extensive use of offsets, activists
observe that the benefits some had expected to result from cap-and-trade
have failed to materialize.141  Although the climate program appears on 
track to easily achieve its 2020 GHG reduction targets, its success in
reducing GHG emissions has not led to co-pollutant benefits in some of 
the state’s most polluted areas. These views critically informed the tense 
debates in 2016 and 2017 over a new GHG reduction target and the extension
of cap-and-trade, discussed below.142 
II. THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN DETERMINING THE 

FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA CLIMATE POLICY: THE 2030

TARGET AND THE FATE OF CAP-AND-TRADE
 
By 2015, almost ten years after passing AB 32 and with the 2020 target 
approaching quickly, the California Legislature once again confronted big 
questions about California climate policy: the need for a post-2020 GHG 
reduction target and the primary mechanisms for achieving that target.
Environmental justice considerations were a central issue in legislative 
negotiations.
A. The Role of Environmental Justice in Setting the
2030 Greenhouse Gas Target 
After a year of tough negotiating and failed efforts, in 2016 the California
legislature passed SB 32,143 which established a demanding 2030 greenhouse
 141. See Envtl. Just. Advisory Comm., supra note 24, Clause 11. Fran Pavley, a co­
author of AB 32, said that, although the law was not specifically designed to address 
traditional air pollutants, “it envisioned the program would bring cleaner air to the low-
income neighborhoods located near regulated facilities.” CALMATTERS, supra note 136. 
Martha Argüello, Executive Director of Physicians for Social Responsibility, stated that:
“‘[t]here was a promise with cap and trade not to make things worse.  The data shows 
that’s happening. Promise broken.’” Id.
 142. See Tony Barboza and Chris Megerian, Gov. Brown Tours Polluted L.A. Neighborhoods 
to See Firsthand Where Progress Lags, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2017) (describing California 
lawmakers’ concern that, although California widely touts its environmental policies, 
“many areas haven’t felt the benefits”), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln­
brown-environmental-justice-20170523-story.html [[https://perma.cc/5Y83-KVTU]. 
143. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (Deering 2017). For a revealing article on the 
legislative history of the bill, including the role of industry, environmental justice, and
 111











   











   
 
 










   
 
  
gas reduction target: 40 percent below 1990 GHG emission levels, a level
much more demanding than the achievement of 1990 levels slated for 
2020.  The Governor, Jerry Brown, and numerous lawmakers had hoped
that the legislation would explicitly incorporate an extension of the cap­
and-trade program.144 However, environmental justice advocates and their 
legislative allies opposed inclusion of the cap-and-trade program, arguing 
that the program, to date, had failed to achieve co-pollutant reduction benefits 
in many disadvantaged communities and should not continue as a mainstay
of the state’s climate program.145 
Environmental justice advocates not only opposed the inclusion of cap­
and-trade into SB 32, they played a key role in the development and adoption 
of AB 197, a companion bill that explicitly prioritized direct emission 
reductions and furthered several additional environmental justice goals.146 
AB 197 and SB 32 traveled the legislative path as a pair.  SB 32, setting the 
target, would take effect only if AB 197, including a range of environmental 
justice provisions, was adopted.147 
political partnerships and maneuvers, see Chris Megerian & Melanie Mason, California’s 
New Climate Change Laws Almost didn’t happen this year. Here’s how lawmakers pulled 
it off, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-climate­
deal-inside-look-20160902-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/TRC7-CPUS].
144. David Siders, This is What the Climate Bill Jerry Brown Signed Means, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/
capitol-alert/article100734142.html. While the Legislature was negotiating S.B. 32, the 
courts were adjudicating a case challenging the cap-and-trade program as an unlawful tax.
Lawmakers hoped to enshrine cap-and-trade in the statute in order to insulate the future
cap-and-trade program from legal challenge.  In April 2017, in a split decision, a California 
appellate court affirmed a district court’s holding that the program did not impose an 
unlawful tax. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694, 
700 (Ct. App. 2017), http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Emmett/Opinion_April_2017-Ct_App.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J9GJ-R3VG].
145. See Megerian & Mason, supra note 143 (observing that poor areas that suffer some 
of “the worst air quality in the country . . . have felt left behind [California’s environmental 
gains]”); Center for Race, Poverty & the Environment, Cap-and-Trade in California (describing
environmental justice opposition to the extension of cap-and-trade), https://crpe-ej.org/resources/ 
policy/cap-and-trade/ [https://perma.cc/E7WM-2R8G] (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
146. See Legislative Counsel Bureau, Assembly Bill No. 197 Chapter 250: Legislative 
Counsel’s Digest, State Air Res. Bd.: Greenhouse Gas: Regulations, https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB197 [https://perma.cc/S3PS-CX72];
California Environmental Justice Alliance, Front and Center in Climate Policy: Environmental 
Justice Plays Key Role in Winning Next Generation Of Climate Policies (Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://caleja.org/2016/08/front-and-center-in-climate-policy-environmental-justice-plays­
key-role-in-winning-next-generation-of-climate-policies/ [https://perma.cc/HEA4-QWWB] .
147. See Legislative Counsel Bureau, Senate Bill No. 32 Chapter 249: Legislative 
Counsel’s Digest, California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006: emissions limit,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB32 [https://
perma.cc/Z749-MZQ4]. Other AB 197 provisions required CARB to incorporate the social 
cost of carbon–the benefits of averting climate change. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562.5
(Deering 2017). In addition, AB 197 contained a number of procedural mechanisms to 
112
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The most significant substantive provision in AB 197 provided that the 
agency was to “prioritize . . . direct emission reductions” from large sources 
and mobile sources.148  At a minimum, this provision suggests that carbon 
offsets, which achieve the target through reductions by non-covered sources, 
should not be prioritized.  Although it does not rule out reductions achieved
through the operation of cap-and-trade (since cap-and-trade, without offsets, 
would in fact lead to reductions from the large sources subject to the program),
commentary suggests legislative intent to maximize the use of direct regulation
of (not just direct emission reductions at) large and mobile sources.149 
The strength of the environmental justice agenda in 2016 was further 
actualized through a slate of additional environmental and social justice bills.150 
They included several of the justice-oriented policies discussed above, like
increasing investment of auction revenue in disadvantaged communities,
targeting low-emission vehicle rebates in low-income communities, and
creating the local community planning program.151  As one reporter described
facilitate the achievement of environmental justice goals, including new ways to more
effectively report and display GHG and co-pollutant emissions data. See id. § 38531 (2017). 
The requirements were intended to overcome the significant challenges researchers have
encountered in tracking the relationship between facilities’ GHG, toxic, and criteria 
emissions. See Cushing, et al., supra note 119, at 11 (providing several recommendations 
to better facilitate tracking the public health and equity aspects of cap-and-trade); OEHHA,
supra note 7, at x (noting that data on GHG, toxics, and criteria pollutants is collected under 
different programs, complicating data analysis). In addition, to address the fragmentation
of legislative oversight over CARB’s many GHG reduction programs, overseen by a diverse 
array of legislative committees, AB 197 created the Joint Legislative Committee on
Climate Change Policies, consisting of members from both the state Assembly and Senate.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9147.10 (Deering 2017).  The Committee is intended to provide the
Legislature with a more holistic mechanism for understanding and assessing implementation
of the state’s climate laws. 
148. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562.5 (Deering 2017). AB 197 instructs ARB to
“prioritize . . . (a) Emission reduction rules and regulations that result in direct emission 
reductions at large stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions sources and direct
emission reductions from mobile sources,” as well as rules and regulations that lead to
direct emission reductions from other sources. Id. § 38562.5 (2017). 
149. Ann Carlson, Does AB 197 Mean the End of Cap and Trade?, LEGAL PLANET
BLOG (Aug. 24, 2017), http://legal-planet.org/2016/08/24/does-ab-197-mean-the-end-of­
cap-and-trade-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/ZV8T-6MGD]. 
150. See California Environmental Justice Alliance, 5 Environmental Justice Bills Advance 
to Governor Brown’s Desk! (Sept. 15, 2016), http://caleja.org/2016/09/5-environmental­
justice-bills-advance-to-governor-browns-desk/ [https://perma.cc/5RKJ-CA8W]. 
151. See Liam Dillon, City & State: Climate Change Funding Climbs; Brown Signs 
Four Bills to Boost Spending on Emission-Curbing Efforts, with More for Low-income
Communities, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la­
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it, these measures “were advanced . . . as many lawmakers representing
low-income communities of color made themselves a force in the state’s
climate change debate after complaints that existing policies weren’t doing 
enough to benefit the districts they represent.”152 




Although the Brown Administration was unable to codify the cap-and­
trade program in 2016, the Administration continued to work toward that
goal, a goal shared by industry interests perceiving cap-and-trade as cheaper 
than more direct emission controls or requirements.153  In 2017, the Legislature,
Governor’s Office, and an array of stakeholders engaged in highly contentious
discussions over competing cap-and-trade bills.  Recognizing persistent 
concentrations of air pollution in disadvantaged communities notwithstanding
existing air pollution control efforts, as well as environmental justice activists’ 
opposition to cap-and-trade,154 legislators hotly debated whether and how
to incorporate environmental justice concerns.
1. 	AB 378: An Unsuccessful Effort to Integrate Cap-and-Trade and 
Environmental Justice 
During Spring 2017, California Assembly member Cristina Garcia, who 
represents East Los Angeles, contended that the current climate program
has reduced carbon emissions, “‘but it hasn’t been equitable across the 
pol-sac-essential-politics-updates-gov-brown-signs-new-laws-to-boost-1473881012-html
story.html [https://perma.cc/NX3Z-LMXH].
152. Id. See also California Environmental Justice Alliance, supra note 150 (describing
role of environmental justice interests in passing SB 32/AB 197 package). 
153. See The Climate v. Local Pollution, supra note 88 (observing that cap-and-trade 
provides a cheaper mechanism for controlling emissions and that “industry groups are 
lobbying hard to preserve the cap and trade program”). 
154. A February 2017 declaration adopted by the Environmental Justice Advisory
Committee stated that “[t]he California Environmental Justice Advisory Committee . . .
DECLARES that we will oppose at every turn all efforts to extend the California Cap
and Trade system in California beyond 2020 . . . .” Environmental Justice Advisory Comm.,
supra note 24. They further resolved “that the California Environmental Justice Movement will
oppose efforts by our state government to extend Cap and Trade, because this program will
not reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the pace called for by the international scientific
community, it will not result in a shift to clean and sustainable energy sources, it will
support and enrich the state’s worst polluters, it will fail to address the existing and future 
inequitable burden of pollution, [and] it will deprive communities of the ability to protect 
and enhance their communities.” Id.
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state’”155 and has failed to bring economic or public health benefits to
“predominantly low-income and minority communities.”156  In an effort
to “‘meaningfully integrate[] cap and trade with air quality,’”157 she introduced 
AB 378, which extended cap-and-trade to 2030 but incorporated numerous
environmental justice constraints.158 The bill would have tasked CARB
with adopting “the most effective and equitable mix of emission reduction 
measures to achieve the 2030 goal,” and with ensuring “that emission reduction 
measures collectively and individually support achieving air quality and 
other environmental and public health goals.”159 
More specifically, referencing AB 197, the 2016 bill that prioritized direct 
emission reductions, AB 378 provided that CARB could “complement
direct emission reductions” with “market-based” limits through 2030,160 
thereby extending cap-and-trade.  To further emission reductions in polluted 
areas, AB 378 authorized CARB to “adopt no-trade zones or facility-specific
declining greenhouse gas emissions limits where facilities’ emissions contribute 
to a cumulative pollution burden that creates a significant health impact.”161 
In addition, reflecting concerns that existing sources are inadequately
regulated, the law directly required CARB to establish criteria and toxic
air pollution standards for industrial facilities.162  It then provided that CARB 
could not distribute GHG allowances to industrial facilities violating these 
standards.163
 155. Alexei Koseff, Lawmakers push for ‘environmental justice’ in California carbon 
reduction policy, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics­
government/capitol-alert/article131809264.html [https://perma.cc/PB9C-K3D6].
156. Id. Prior to the Assembly’s vote, Rep. Garcia commented that her district, East 
Los Angeles, “has been treated like a ‘wasteland,’ and that the key question is: ‘Do we all
matter?’” Katy Murphy, Climate change and bail reform bills fall short in California Assembly, 
MERCURY NEWS (June 1, 2017), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/06/01/climate-change­
and-bail-reform-bills-fall-short-in-the-california-assembly/ [https://perma.cc/4UGS-GNBU].
157. John Meyers, With Democrats Divided, Assembly Rejects a Plan to Extend
California’s Cap-and-Trade Program, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2017). 
158. Greenhouse gases, criteria air pollutants, and toxic air contaminants, AB 378, 
2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201720180AB378 [https://perma.cc/CJ2N-ETXF] [hereinafter AB 378]. 
159. Id. at Sec. 4 (proposing to add HEALTH & SAFETY § 38567). 
160. Id. at Sec. 2 (proposing to amend HEALTH & SAFETY § 38562.5(b)). 
161. Id. (proposing to amend HEALTH & SAFETY § 38562.5(c)).
162. Id. (proposing to amend HEALTH & SAFETY § 38562.6(b)). 
163. Id. at Sec. 3 (proposing to add HEALTH & SAFETY § 38562.6(c)). 
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Around the same time, lawmakers introduced SB 775,164 another cap­
and-trade extension bill that included several provisions that appealed to 
environmental justice activists.165  The bill required all allowances to be
auctioned rather than distributed for free,166 and prohibited the use of offsets.167 
In addition, it featured the return of climate dividends to consumers, a 
mechanism that could mitigate the cost of transitioning to a low-carbon
economy.168 Amy Vanderwarker and Kay Cuajunco, of the California
Environmental Justice Alliance, said the dividend is “[o]ne of the most
exciting aspects of the bill from an environmental justice perspective” and 
noted the importance of “find[ing] a way to ease the cost burden for our 
most vulnerable residents” given the large proportion of their income spent 
on energy costs.169 
These bills did not, however, move forward.  SB 775 did not appear to 
have come up for a vote.  AB 378, with its extensive environmental justice 
provisions, was just shy of a majority.170  According to one observer, business- 
aligned moderate Democrats and Republicans resisted the effort to link 
traditional air pollution and GHG emissions measures.171 Moreover, although 
the legislature and CARB have routinely embraced environmental justice 
goals and the value of linking climate and air pollution objectives, they
have consistently resisted efforts to integrate co-pollutants into the actual
operation of the cap-and-trade program, one of AB 378’s most controversial 
features.
 164. S.B. 775 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006: market-based compliance 
mechanisms,  2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billText 
Client.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB775 [https://perma.cc/Q8NU-CZJB] [hereinafter S.B.  775]. 
165. See Amy Vanderwarker and Kay Cuajunco, Equity at the Center: SB 775 and 
AB 378 Create New Path towards More Equitable, Effective, Climate Policy, LEGAL PLANET 
BLOG (May 12, 2017), http://legal-planet.org/2017/05/12/guest-bloggers-amy-vanderwarker­
and-kay-cuajunco-equity-at-the-center-sb-775-and-ab-378-create-new-path/ [https://perma.cc/
RH7J-TJNP].
166.  S.B. 775 Sec. 4 (proposing to add HEALTH & SAFETY § 38574.5(b)(5)).
167. Id. (proposing to add HEALTH & SAFETY § 38574.5(b)(11)).
168. Id. at Sec. 6 (proposing to add HEALTH & SAFETY § 38577.2, creating a California 
Climate Dividend Program). 
169. See Vanderwarker & Cuajunco, supra note 165. 
170. AB 378, supra note 158 (history page, noting June 1, 2017, 39–34 vote against 
passage). One reporter notes that the bill “died amid heavy lobbying from the oil industry.” 
The Climate v. Local Pollution, supra note 88. 
171. See Meyers, supra note 157. 
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2. AB 398 and AB 617: A New Cap-and-Trade/Environmental
Justice Legislative Package 
In July 2017, a different legislative package succeeded.  The legislature
adopted AB 398,172 which extended the cap-and-trade program to 2030,
coupled with AB 617, which included environmental justice provisions. 
AB 398 did not simply extend the existing program for ten years; to obtain
the desired two-thirds vote, it included numerous changes in the program 
and concessions to various interests, some to address environmental concerns, 
but most to address industry interests, particularly in the oil and gas sector.173 
To address industry concerns, AB 398 provided firmer cost containment
measures than in the state’s existing program, including a price ceiling.174 
In addition, the law preserved free allowances for industry.175  The bill also
preempted local air districts from imposing GHG reduction requirements
on stationary sources in the state’s cap-and-trade program,176 effectively 
halting GHG control efforts underway in the Bay Area.177 Lastly, the law
explicitly prevented not only local air districts, but CARB itself from adopting
any additional limitations on refineries and oil and gas production beyond 
existing controls—gutting CARB’s then-proposed direct refinery limits.178 
On the environmental justice side, AB 398 reduced, but did not eliminate,
permissible levels of offset use.  From 2021 to 2025, covered entities can
172.  A.B. 398, ch.135, (Cal. 2017). 
173. See Mason et al., supra note 88; Katy Murphy, Jerry Brown Implores Lawmakers
to Take the ‘Most Important Vote of Your Life,’ THE MERCURY NEWS (July 13, 2017). 
174. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38562(c)(2)(A)(i). The bill left the determination of the 
specific price ceiling to CARB.  In addition, the bill offers “price containment points” to
alleviate high prices before the ceiling is reached.  Id. at § 38562(c)(2)(B). CARB must
use the revenue generated from the sale of price-containing allowances to fund emissions 
reductions. Id. at § 38562(c)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
175. AB 398 preserves the “industry assistance factors,” which established the ratio 
of free to auctioned allowances, that were in place from 2015-2017. Id. at § 38562(c)(2)(G). The
original cap-and-trade program provided free allowances to industry at the outset to help 
them adjust to the program, and then anticipated that, after 2020, the free allowances would
be phased out and industry would be required to purchase allowances. See Jason Ye, Center for 
Climate and Energy Solutions, Summary of California’s Extension of its Cap-and-Trade 
Program 2 (Aug. 2017), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/09/summary-californias- 
extension-its-cap-trade-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z227-SVDX].
176. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38594(b).
177. See infra notes 305–09 and accompanying text. 
178. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38592.5(a)(1). CARB can, however, still limit methane and 
fugitive emissions from refineries and oil and gas production, and maintains its authority
over clean cars and fuel content. Id. at § 38592.5(a)(3). 
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use offsets to cover only four percent of their emissions, rather than the
eight percent currently permitted.179 From 2026 to 2030, when the program’s 
caps will be more demanding, entities can use offsets to cover up to six 
percent of their emissions.180  In addition, reflecting concern that the majority
of offset projects have been located outside of California,181 one-half of
the offsets must “provide direct environmental benefits” to California.182 
Given the political and environmental stakes associated with offsets, the
bill also created the “Compliance Offsets Protocol Task Force.”183  The law
specified that the task force should include a broad range of stakeholders 
and should prioritize offsets that benefit disadvantaged communities.184 
The law also created priorities for the use of auction revenue post-2020. 
The first priority is reductions in air toxics and criteria air pollutants from 
stationary and mobile sources, followed by numerous additional initiatives to
foster sustainability, research, and climate adaptation.185 
AB 617,186 the companion environmental justice legislation, provided a
separate path for addressing co-pollutant concerns.  The law includes new
monitoring requirements and a pathway to state and local measures to reduce
cumulative burdens.  Recognizing that, at best, air quality monitoring captures 
general levels of regional air quality and fails to capture localized hot spots,187 
AB 617 requires the state to convene multiple stakeholders to develop a 
plan for better monitoring toxics and criteria pollutants and to select the highest
priority areas for deploying community monitoring systems.188  To better
understand the sources of community exposures, local air districts are 
179.  A.B. 398, ch. 135, Sec. 4 (Cal. 2017); Ye, supra note 175. 
180.  A.B. 398, ch. 135, Sec. 4 (Cal. 2017); Ye, supra note 175. 
181. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
182. A.B. 398, ch. 135, Sec. 4 (Cal. 2017). “Direct environmental benefits in the state”
is defined as “the reduction or avoidance of any air pollutants in the state or the reduction 
or avoidance of any pollutant that could have an adverse impact on waters of the state.”
Id.
 183. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38591.1.
184. Id.
 185. Id. § 38590.1(a).
186. AB-617 Nonvehicular air pollution: criteria air pollutants and toxic air
contaminants, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (2017), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billText 
Client.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB617 [https://perma.cc/X2WC-A3BN]. 
187. See Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hot 
Spot Pollution (draft, on file with author).
188. HEALTH & SAFETY § 42705.5. The law indicates that the highest priority areas 
“shall be communities with high exposure burdens for toxic air contaminants and criteria 
air pollutants.” Id. § 42705.5(c). Local air districts are then responsible for deploying the 
community monitoring systems by July 1, 2019. Id. CARB will continue to identify high 
priority areas over time and, as such areas are identified, local air districts will have one year to
establish community monitoring systems. Id. § 42705.5(d). In addition, recognizing continuing
challenges in obtaining accurate and consolidated emissions data, AB 617 requires CARB 
to develop a statewide protocol for emissions reporting. Id. § 39607.1(b)(1). 
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empowered to require large stationary sources to deploy fenceline monitoring.189 
In addition, the law requires the state to identify areas experiencing the
most significant cumulative emissions burdens.190 
Based on the data resulting from improved monitoring, the state, by 
October 2018, is required to develop a statewide strategy for reducing 
toxic air contaminants and criteria air pollutants in communities with high 
cumulative burdens.191  That strategy will then lay the groundwork for specific
community emission reduction programs.192 
AB 617 included several other provisions to accelerate direct controls on 
toxic and criteria pollutants.  AB 617 accelerates deadlines for existing
stationary sources in nonattainment areas to install the “best available 
retrofit control technology” (BARCT).193 The acceleration of BARCT
requirements provides at least a partial response to AB 398’s preemption
of local air district controls on stationary sources.  However, the provision 
does not guarantee reductions at all eligible sources; it allows facilities to
use “emission reduction credits” to meet the BARCT emissions rate
requirements in lieu of physically upgrading technology.194 
Overall, the cap-and-trade extension process revealed the high political, 
economic, and environmental stakes associated with the state’s climate 
policies. Compromises abounded, with industry achieving significant 
concessions in the primary cap-and-trade extension and environmental 
justice stakeholders achieving a companion bill that, although not directly 
addressing concerns about cap-and-trade, nonetheless renews attention on 
the cumulative burdens many communities continue to endure.  It appears 
that, to get the Governor’s sought-after two-thirds vote, all key players obtained
significant benefits—and these key players decided to endure the concessions
made to their adversaries in order to hold onto their own achievements. 
C. The 2030 Scoping Plan
As noted above, California’s mechanism for integrating its many programs 
and demonstrating how it will attain its GHG target is the scoping plan
 189. Id. § 42705.5(c).
190. Id. § 44391.2(b)(1). 
191. Id. § 44391.2(b).
192. Id. § 44391.2(c)
193. Id. § 40920.6(c). Facilities are to upgrade at the earliest feasible time, and no 
later than December 31, 2023. Id. To encourage compliance, the law establishes clear and
specific penalties for air pollution violations. Id. §§ 42400, 42402. 
194. Id. § 40920.6(c).
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process.  In December 2017, the Air Resources Board approved a new plan 
to achieve the GHG reduction target of 40 percent below 1990 levels by
2030.195  The 2030 emissions limit is 260 million metric tons of carbon-dioxide
equivalent (MMTCO2e).196  CARB is focused not only on the 2030 target
itself, but on cumulative emissions throughout the period from 2021­
2030.197  In order to ensure reductions throughout the next decade, CARB
has set a goal of reducing cumulative emissions by 621 MMTCO2e.198 
Because California has been passing legislation and CARB had already 
been developing measures to meet the 2030 target—first established by
Executive Order in 2015—the 2030 Scoping Plan largely relies on the 
many initiatives for the transportation, energy, industrial, agricultural, and 
housing sectors described above.199  A general summary of the measures,
their estimated contribution to achieving reductions between 2021 and 
2030, and their percentage contributions to the cumulative reductions are 
summarized in the table below. 
195. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Resolution 17-46: 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan Update, 
at 9, https://www.arb.ca.gov/board/res/2017/res17-46.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6FY-VQFJ].
196. Id. at 26. 
197. Id. CARB notes that “[a] cumulative construct provides a more complete way
to evaluate the effectiveness of any measure over time, instead of just considering a snapshot 
for a single year.” Id.
 198. Id. 
199. See supra notes 30–63 and accompanying text (describing current implementation 
steps). See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 25 (Table 1, describing policy
scenario, which—aside from cap-and-trade—consists primarily of “known commitments” 
based upon existing legislation and policies).  Not all sector-specific goals are achievable
based on known commitments. For example, the Scoping Plan states the goal of reducing 
light-duty vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by 15 percent by 2050, but, recognizing that the 
existing regional planning mechanism, SB 375, will probably be insufficient to achieve 
that target, stipulates the need for additional measures. See id. at 78.
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TABLE 1











50 % RPS 16 2.6%201 










(mobile sources clean 
fuels and technology 













Total 621 100%203 
200. The measures and estimated tons of reductions are drawn from Figure 7 in the 
November Scoping Plan, “Scoping Plan Scenario—Estimated Cumulative GHG Reductions 
by Measure (2021-30).” Id. at 28. 
201. The relatively small contribution of the RPS is surprising. It is possible that
substantial renewables investments expected to be in place by 2020 reduce the additional 
investment needed to meet the 2030 RPS target. 
202. “TCU” stands for “transportation, communications, and utilities.” NOVEMBER 
2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 109. 
203. Rounding of the measure-specific percentages leads to 100.2%, rounded down 
here to 100%. 
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Although sector-specific prescriptive measures were largely responsible
for achieving the 2020 emission reduction target, currently planned measures
will not achieve the 2030 target.  By 2030, there is a 236 MMTCO2e gap 
between the estimated reductions from known commitments and the 621
MMTCO2e cumulative emissions reduction goal—38 percent of the total
reductions to be achieved by 2030.204  At present, CARB is primarily relying 
on the cap-and-trade program to fill that gap. 
However, it is possible that CARB will adopt additional direct actions
between now and 2030, lessening reliance on cap-and-trade.  In virtually
every sector, the Scoping Plan lists “potential additional actions” that could 
increase emissions reductions from more direct sector-based policies.  For 
example, in the energy sector, CARB suggests that it will continue to explore
efforts to increase renewable energy use and storage capacity, continue to 
promote and expand energy efficiency and the electrification of buildings,
and other measures.205  In the industry sector, CARB anticipates exploring 
greater use of renewable energy at industrial sources, partnering “with
California’s local air districts to effectively use BARCT to achieve air quality 
and GHG reduction co-benefits at large industrial sources,” and other
206measures.
In sum, the scoping plan continues to include substantial direct measures
to reduce emissions.  However, given the much more demanding target, 
the gap between what direct measures are expected to accomplish and the
target is much greater than it was for the 2020 target. Although CARB or 
the state legislature may add some additional direct measures, it is likely 
that a higher proportion of the reductions for the 2030 target will be driven
by the cap-and-trade program than occurred in the past. 




As the preceding pages reveal, California has incorporated an unprecedented 
degree of attention to environmental justice in its climate policies.  At the 
same time, environmental justice advocates have been disappointed that 
some of their hoped-for policy choices have not been adopted. In this part, I
highlight substantive and procedural environmental justice achievements
and then turn to a number of limitations that have emerged. 
204. See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10 (discussing the known
commitments described in the scoping plan, which are expected to bring emissions down 
to 320 MMTCO2e, leaving a gap of 60). 
205. Id. at 69. 
206. Id. at 73. 
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A. Integrating Environmental Justice into Climate Change Policy 
In both its rhetoric and its specific programs, California has integrated 
environmental justice considerations into its climate policies.  Substantively, 
that integration is visible in programs that integrate climate and traditional
pollutants and in programs that distribute environmental and economic 
benefits to disadvantaged communities.  Procedurally, environmental justice
representatives have obtained defined participatory opportunities that help 
amplify the voices of often-marginalized communities. 
1. Substantive Provisions 
a. A Multipollutant Approach 
One of the most important features of California’s climate initiatives is 
their integration of climate and traditional air pollutant objectives, particularly
in the energy and transportation sectors. Multipollutant strategies allow 
policymakers to maximize GHG and co-pollutant reduction benefits, where
these benefits align, and to explicitly address tradeoffs where they do not.207 
In general, because combustion generates both GHGs and co-pollutants
that flow through the same smokestacks and tailpipes, efforts to limit fossil-
fuel combustion will achieve reductions in both types of emissions.208 
Strategies to reduce or control combustion are thus likely to maximize 
pollution reduction co-benefits. 
Moreover, where emissions of GHGs and co-pollutants are not correlated, 
a multipollutant approach allows policymakers to deliberately consider
the tradeoffs and make informed decisions about the best path forward.
So, for example, biomass combustion, even if considered neutral from a
 207. See generally Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, The Clean Air Act, and Industrial
Pollution, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 69–72 (2012) (discussing the administrative 
and technical benefits of multi-pollutant approaches), https://escholarship.org/content/qt6qr7z0d4/ 
qt6qr7z0d4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TQW-UR3P].
208. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards et al., PSD and Title V Permitting
Guidance for Greenhouse Gases, 29, 41 (Mar. 2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-07/documents/ghgguid.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LC7-AUDK].
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GHG perspective,209 generates co-pollutant emissions210 that should be
considered in determining the appropriate role for biomass as a GHG-
control strategy.  Conversely, some co-pollutant control strategies, like 
scrubbers to reduce air pollutants, reduce energy efficiency, and thus have 
adverse GHG consequences that should be considered in determining the 
best modes for co-pollutant controls.211 
A multi-pollutant approach does not guarantee environmental justice 
results. As discussed further below, generalized approaches to pollution 
control could fail to direct reductions where they are most needed.212 
Nonetheless, strategies that integrate GHG and co-pollutant goals increase
the likelihood that the state’s climate policy will improve air quality, a 
critical environmental justice objective. 
Scholars and policymakers have recognized the value of a multipollutant
approach. In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences criticized single-
pollutant policies, stating that “[i]ntegrated assessments that consider multiple 
pollutants (ozone, particulate matter, and hazardous air pollutants) and
multiple effects (health, ecosystem, visibility, and global climate change) 
in a single approach are needed.”  Although generally constrained by the 
Clean Air Act’s pollutant-by-pollutant approach, EPA has attempted to
encourage multi-pollutant approaches where possible.  Under the Obama 
Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which was designed to control GHG
emissions from existing power plants, EPA encouraged states, in developing 
state implementation plans to control GHG emissions from their power plants, 
to take a multi-pollutant approach.213 And, although EPA never carried
 209. See U.S. Energy Info Admin., Biomass Explained: Biomass and the Environment
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=biomass 
_environment [https://perma.cc/J3Q2-XQUK] (suggesting that biomass can be considered
carbon-neutral because the combusted plants sequester the released carbon when they
are grown). Cf. 17 CODE REG. § 95852.2 (stating that California’s cap-and-trade program 
exempts biomass-derived GHG emissions from the cap-and-trade program, although sources
must report their emissions). 
210. See R.L. Bain et al., Biopower Technical Assessment: State of the Industry and
Technology, 6-1–6-7 (Mar. 2003), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy03osti/33123.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/MDT2-ZRXM].
211. See Stephen P. Holland, Spillovers from Climate Policy 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 16158, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16158.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/NK3W-XH3U] (observing that measures to increase natural gas combustion 
efficiency to lower GHG emissions could increase nitrogen oxide emissions, and so may
not present an optimal strategy for reducing GHG emissions). 
212. See infra note 238 (discussing concern that generalized environmental control 
approaches fail to adequately reduce localized hot spots of pollution). 
213. See Envtl. Protection Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electrical Generating Units, 80 FED. REG. 64661, 64918 (Oct. 23, 
2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22842.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HB5D-Y56Q] (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2017­
title40-vol8/xml/CFR-2017-title40-vol8-part60.xml [https://perma.cc/6LXS-R7LH]).
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through, the agency’s initial plan for reducing GHG emissions from refineries
contemplated “a comprehensive approach of simultaneously addressing 
different types of air pollution (GHG, toxics and “criteria” pollutants) 
from different points at the refinery at the same time. . . .”214 
AB 32, the original climate law, made clear that the state’s climate policies
should complement efforts to achieve air quality to the extent feasible.215 
A principal author of the law, legislator Fran Pavley, stated that they intended
to launch a “multi-benefit approach . . . As we reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, we would also be able to reduce criteria air pollutants which 
have . . . localized direct health impacts.”216 Regional air districts, on the front
lines for achieving air quality objectives in a state still struggling to achieve 
public health standards, have likewise focused on the relationships between 
GHGs and their co-pollutants.217 
California’s multipollutant approach to address climate change flows in 
part from the state’s longstanding efforts to address its persistent air quality
challenges.218  The twin goals of reducing GHGs and improving air quality
are repeatedly referenced in the November 2017 Scoping Plan.219 For example,
it states that
214. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: Settlement Agreements to Address 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electricity Generating Units and Refineries: Fact Sheet, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/settlement
factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5KU-59YN] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017). 
215. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38562(b)(4) (stating that, to the extent feasible and consistent
with achieving the GHG emissions limit, CARB should “[e]nsure that activities undertaken
pursuant to the regulations complement, and do not interfere with, efforts to achieve” air
quality standards and toxics reductions). 
216. Julie Cart, ‘Trying to breathe’—As CA toasts environmental win, pollution still
plagues, CALMATTERS (July 27, 2017), https://calmatters.org/articles/california-environmental­
success-poor-communities-remain-polluted/ [https://perma.cc/7QMA-NYXN]. 
217. See infra notes 228–37 and accompanying text (discussing Bay Area and southern
California air quality plans integrating GHG and co-pollutant reduction efforts). 
218. See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 14 (observing that several 
Plan strategies were designed to achieve air quality standards but will also reduce GHGs),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9PR­
B4H4].
219. See, e.g., id. at ES-1 (describing multiple goals, including both GHG and
traditional air pollution reduction), ES-7 (describing industry policies to reduce both GHG 
and traditional pollutants), ES-15 (describing Plan’s non-GHG co-benefits), 1 (stating that 
the plan’s strategies will “deliver climate, air quality, and other benefits), 5 (observing that
the plan creates a path to make progress on both climate and air quality, and stating that GHG 
reduction requirements will complement criteria and air toxic requirements), 14 (observing that
the state’s actions will create “a sustainable future that considers both climate and air quality
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The State’s climate goals require a comprehensive approach that integrates and
builds upon multiple ongoing State efforts. As we address future mobility, we identify
how existing efforts . . . can complement each other while providing multiple
environmental benefits, including air quality and climate benefits.  The collective
consideration of these efforts illuminates the synergies and conflicts between policies.220 
The Scoping Plan notes that the mobile source strategies “were specifically
developed with the goal of achieving health-based air quality standards by
reducing criteria and toxics emissions as well as GHG emissions
simultaneously.”221  Diesel controls (now partially integrated into the short-
lived climate pollutant’s black carbon reduction strategy)222 and programs 
to transition to zero or near-zero emission vehicles223 are intended to 
accomplish significant climate and air pollution reduction objectives that 
are likely to benefit disadvantaged communities who are disproportionately 
located close to the state’s roadways.224  In addition, the state’s efforts to 
address freight transport and port pollution are likely to reduce GHG emissions
and air pollution in the heavily burdened communities located close to
major ports in both northern and southern California.225 
Although the state’s energy objectives have not met environmental
justice recommendations in scale or in terms of facility-specific limits, the 
state’s renewable portfolio standard and energy efficiency objectives have
been designed to achieve both climate and air pollution benefits.  The 
November 2017 Scoping Plan states that “renewable energy and energy
efficiency measures can result in significant public health and climate 
objectives”), 47 (noting that the scoping plan’s mobile source provisions were designed to
reduce criteria and GHG emissions simultaneously). 
Strategy is to “maximize air pollutant reductions and other co-benefits, especially considering
 220. Id. at 12–13. 




See supra note 43. 
See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 1.
For example, a guiding principle for the state’s Short-Lived Climate Pollutant 
disadvantaged communities,” SCLP, supra note 43, at 4. The plan emphasizes that it has 
developed an “integrated mobile source strategy to meet air quality and climate mandates, 
reduce petroleum use, and reduce near source risk.” Id. at 49. CARB observes that the 
strategy would improve air quality and reduce health effects and that “[t]hese and other 
health benefits can be maximized as part of an integrated approach to ensure that strategies
used to reduce SLCP emissions all help to improve air quality and water quality on a regional
basis”). Id. at 13.
 225. See SUSTAINABLE FREIGHT ACTION PLAN, supra note 42, at 1, 6–7. In November 
2017, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (the San Pedro Bay Ports), adopted their
2017 Clean Air Action Plan, designed to sharply reduce diesel emissions by shifting to
zero-emission cargo-handling equipment by 2030 and zero-emission trucks by 2035.  See 
SAN PEDRO PORTS, CLEAN AIR ACTION PLAN 2017 41 (Nov. 2017) (noting zero-emission





























   
 
       
 
 
    





[VOL. 9:  83, 2017–18] A Broader Vision for Climate Policy 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
benefits by displacing air pollution and GHG emissions from fossil-fuel
based energy sources, as well as by reducing the health and environmental
risks . . . [from producing, transporting, and storing] fossil fuels, especially for 
communities living near fossil-fuel based energy operations.”226  In-state 
electricity emissions do not appear to have been reduced to date,227 but the
state’s more ambitious 2030 target, energy efficiency goals, and RPS are
likely to lead to reductions in in-state GHG and co-pollutant emissions in
the long-term. 
California air districts with on-going air quality issues have also recognized 
the value of a multi-pollutant approach.  The Bay Area Air Quality Management
District (BAAQMD) has been taking a multi-pollutant approach since its 
2010 clean air plan.228  In its 2017 plan, “Spare the Air, Cool the Climate”
(“Spare the Air”), the District continues to lay out a multi-pollutant long­
term strategy. Spare the Air states that the plan is “a multi-pollutant strategy 
to simultaneously reduce emissions and ambient concentrations of ozone, 
fine particulate matter, toxic air contaminants, as well as greenhouse
gases . . .”229  The plan states that, “[s]ince pollutants that impact the air and 
the climate are often emitted by the same sources, emission control programs 
will provide co-benefits in reducing both types of pollutants.”230  In the 
industrial sector, the plan envisions efforts to reduce combustion-related
emissions, focusing on the three largest emissions sources in the Bay Area:
“oil refineries, power plants, and cement[] plants.”231 
The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), along 
with CARB and the San Joaquin air quality district, have also explored
multipollutant approaches.  In their 2012 “Draft Vision for Clean Air: A 
Framework for Air Quality and Climate Planning,” the agencies stated that 
“[m]any of the same technologies will address both air quality and climate 
226. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 66. 
227. As noted above, this could be attributable to a shift from higher-emitting out­
of-state emissions to lower-emitting in-state sources.  See supra note 121.  Other factors can 
also influence electricity sector emissions, including the degree to which drought decreases
hydropower availability and requires greater use of fossil-fuel resources, economic activity, 
weather, and other variables. 
228. See BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., SPARE THE AIR, COOL THE CLIMATE,
A BLUEPRINT FOR CLEAN AIR AND CLIMATE PROTECTIONS IN THE BAY AREA (Jan. 2017),
http://www.baaqmd.gov/~/media/files/planning-and-research/plans/2017-clean-air-plan/
attachment-a_-proposed-final-cap-vol-1-pdf.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/YC5T-AQYC].
229. Id. at ES-4.
 230. Id. at 1–3. 
231. Id. at ES-5.
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needs. As such, strategies developed for air quality and climate change
planning should be coordinated to make the most efficient use of limited
resources and the time needed to develop cleaner technologies.”232  Although 
the vision document focused on transportation emissions, the agencies stated
that “[s]imilar analyses will be necessary for industrial and other emission 
sources to develop a complete foundation for integrated planning.”233 
The SCAQMD’s subsequent 2016 Air Quality Management Plan did not 
take an overt multipollutant approach to meeting the region’s challenging
air quality requirements.  Nonetheless, a key goal of SCAQMD’s plan is to 
“[i]nvest in strategies and technologies meeting multiple objectives regarding 
air quality, climate change, air toxics exposure, energy, and transportation.”234 
SCAQMD’s plan notes that many control efforts combine planning to achieve
multiple co-benefits, and that efforts to clean the air will also reduce GHG 
emissions.235 More specifically, the single most significant strategy for
controlling stationary source emissions is a “transition to zero or near-zero
emission technologies,”236 a strategy that clearly achieves both GHG and 
co-pollutant emission reductions.  And the Ports of Los Angeles and Long
Beach, the largest single polluters in the South Coast—polluters whose actions
will significantly impact the region’s air pollution—have acknowledged 
the close connection between GHG and co-pollutant emissions and have 
set complementary GHG and co-pollutant reduction goals.237  These 
232. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., SAN JOAQUIN
VALLEY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIST., PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT, VISION FOR CLEAN AIR:





 234. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., FINAL 2016 AIR QUALITY MGMT. PLAN
ES-5 (Mar. 2017), http://www.aqmd.gov/docs/default-source/clean-air-plans/air-quality­
management-plans/2016-air-quality-management-plan/final-2016-aqmp/executive-summary.
pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/JZC8-FFNC]. 
235. See id. at 10-6, http://www.aqmd.gov/docs/default-source/clean-air-plans/air­
quality-management-plans/2016-air-quality-management-plan/final-2016-aqmp/chapter10. 
pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/G3VN-BTYJ]. The Plan further recognized the need “for
integrated energy strategies that achieve GHG emission reductions and commensurate reductions 
of criteria pollutants and toxic air emissions.” Id. at 10-7.
 236. Id. at 4–11, http://www.aqmd.gov/docs/default-source/clean-air-plans/air-quality­
management-plans/2016-air-quality-management-plan/final-2016-aqmp/chapter4.pdf?
sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/AZ5W-QV2N].
237. The Plan states that “strategies to reduce GHGs often help to reduce criteria
pollutants, an approach that has been embraced by state and regional air agencies; thus, 
the strategies put in place to achieve the 2030 and 2050 GHG reduction goals will also 
help us achieve our 2023 NOx, DPM, and SOx emission reduction targets and continue to
make further progress. More importantly, the GHG reduction goals align with local, regional, 
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multipollutant initiatives demonstrate the value of developing emission
reduction strategies that recognize the close link between co-pollutants 
and GHG emissions. 
b. Generalized versus Place-Based Controls 
California has largely embraced the co-objectives of reducing GHG and 
co-pollutant emissions, but most of the climate programs have done so 
through generalized approaches, setting sector-wide policies rather than 
location- or source-specific controls.  Because disadvantaged communities
are disproportionately located close to emitting stationary and mobile sources, 
at least some of the policies are likely to provide benefits to the state’s 
most disadvantaged residents. 
Nonetheless, the lack of source-specific controls is an environmental 
justice concern; direct controls in polluted communities would provide 
more certain benefits.238  The general approaches taken to date have not
led to emissions reductions in all heavily-impacted communities.239  However, 
measures to achieve the much more demanding 2030 goals are likely to 
have a greater impact on emissions everywhere than the modest 2020 goals 
and implementing programs. In other words, continued efforts to control 
diesel emissions should lead to air quality improvements along ports, rail,
and roadways, benefitting neighboring disadvantaged communities.  Similarly,
the additional emissions reductions expected from the energy sector could 
potentially inure to the benefit of communities close to electricity-generating 
sources.240  Although the tighter target and ensuing reductions are not certain
and State mandates and commit the Ports to a long-term path toward sustainability and
improved air quality.” SAN PEDRO PORTS, supra note 225, at 26. 
238. See California Environmental Justice Alliance, Justice Deferred: A Break Down of
California’s Cap & Trade Bill from the Environmental Justice Perspective, https://caleja.org/
2017/07/justice-deferred-a-break-down-of-californias-cap-trade-bill-from-the-environmental- 
justice-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/X9W7-UGAR] (noting that “reduction[s] at the source 
are the most direct way to lower greenhouse gas emissions, and have an additional benefit 
of improving local air quality in frontline communities”).
239. See supra section I(D)(2(a). 
240. The likelihood of reductions from energy-generation sources close to disadvantaged
communities is somewhat less predictable than the likelihood of reductions in communities
impacted by diesel emissions. Key issues will be the degree to which reductions occur
from in-state electricity sources rather than out-of-state sources, the location of reductions 
from in-state sources (since not all in-state sources are in disadvantaged communities),
and the degree to which generators turn to biomass, which could achieve some GHG 
benefits, but could have adverse co-pollutant consequences. See supra note 209 (discussing the
risks of biomass as a GHG reduction strategy). 
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to reduce emissions in the most impacted communities, they are more likely
to do so than the existing 2020 target.
While communities facing impacts from mobile and energy-generation 
sources are likely to see emissions reductions, it is less clear that the 
state’s approach to industrial emissions—heavy reliance on cap-and-trade 
—will lead to significant reductions.  The lack of direct measures in the 
industrial sector could lead sources in that sector to disproportionately purchase 
allowances or offsets rather than engaging in emissions reductions, an 
issue discussed further below, in section III(B)(1). 
However, AB 617, the co-pollutant control bill adopted as part of the 
deal to extend cap-and-trade in 2017,241 directly responded to the 
environmental justice community’s concern that generalized controls do 
not necessarily improve localized conditions.  By improving monitoring 
of potential hot spots and requiring strategies to address them, AB 617 
adds an important element missing from the state’s more generic and traditional 
approach to GHG, criteria, and toxic pollution. 
Moreover, the dedication of 35 percent of auction revenue to disadvantaged 
communities provides another mechanism to finance emission-reducing 
activities in burdened communities. To make these efforts more coherent, 
the transformative communities’ program provides resources to help 
communities identify their needs and develop integrated plans to address
them.242  Although these initiatives cannot fundamentally alter the major
transportation and industrial sources—and socioeconomic drivers—that 
have led to cumulative burdens, they could nonetheless provide significant 
revenue for incremental improvements in areas unlikely to have their own 
resources.
c. Access to Opportunities and Economic Justice 
Who will benefit from a clean energy transition?  Will wealthy citizens 
install solar arrays and drive Teslas, while poor citizens, lacking the resources 
to invest in greener options, continue to rely on an increasingly expensive
grid and continue to drive old cars that pollute their neighborhoods? 
Environmental justice advocates have focused not only on pollution control
rules, but on access to the benefits of a clean energy transition.243  Numerous 
241. See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
243. See Deborah Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 VILLANOVA L. REV. 25 (2013);
see also BEN BOVARNICK, ET. AL., CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, STATE POLICIES TO
INCREASE LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES’ ACCESS TO SOLAR POWER (Sept. 2014), at 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/LowIncomeSolar-brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QFU-NUYG]; see also Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift:
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California programs are designed to extend access and reduce impacts. 
Auction revenues from the GGRF not only fund pollution reduction, they
can also be used to finance distributed renewables, consumer energy 
efficiency, or lower-polluting vehicles, and so facilitate the participation
of disadvantaged residents in a clean energy transition.  Other provisions
will also facilitate access to opportunities, including the state’s decision 
to target all rebates for low-emissions vehicles to low-income residents
and the requirement that utilities use revenue from the sale of GHG
allowances to finance solar on multi-family affordable housing.  Some of
these opportunities could also generate economic benefits.  Investments 
in energy efficiency, renewables, and clean infrastructure in disadvantaged
communities could generate clean energy jobs in poor communities. 
California has also adopted measures to address economic justice concerns. 
Transitioning to a low-carbon future will entail costs that would have the 
greatest impact on low-income households and communities in light of 
their limited resources.244  California’s climate and energy policies have 
been attuned to these issues.  Dedicated funding from auction revenue
in disadvantaged communities will finance investments in energy efficiency
and renewables that are intended to reduce the impact of likely increases
in electricity rates associated with the clean energy transition.245  The critical 
issue is not electricity rates, but electricity bills: if rates go up but solar 
panels and energy efficiency investments allow electricity use to go down, 
actual bills could remain the same or decrease.  More directly, utilities must
use the revenue they derive from GHG allowances for ratepayer benefit, 
a responsibility they are accomplishing by providing all California residents 
with climate credits twice per year.246  And, independent of the cap-and­
trade program, longstanding programs to assist low-income California
residents with their energy bills could mitigate the impact of potentially 
increasing electricity and natural gas costs.247 
Learning from Environmental Justice, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 791 (2017); Shelley Welton, 
Clean Electrification, 88 U. COL. L. REV. 571, 631–36 (2017). 
244. See Welton, supra note 243, at 630–33. 
245. See Julian Gattaciecca et. al., Protecting the Most Vulnerable: A Financial 
Analysis of Cap-and-Trade’s Impact on Households in Disadvantaged Communities
across California 4, UCLA LUSKIN SCHOOL OF PUB. AFF. (2016),  http://innovation.luskin. 
ucla.edu/sites/default/files/FINAL%20CAP%20AND%20TRADE%20REPORT.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/83VC-DVF9].
246. See Gattaciecca et. al., supra note 245, at 4. Recent credits were $25–30. See id.
 247. See id. at 5 (describing the “California Alternate Rates for Energy” and Family
Electric Rate Assistance Programs”). See also Cal. P.U.C. Income Qualified Assistance 
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The range of resources California has parlayed to increase access to clean 
energy opportunities and to alleviate economic risks demonstrates that a 
clean energy transition can be inclusive and does not have to jeopardize 
the economic well-being of disadvantaged communities. 
2. Procedural Environmental Justice Provisions 
California’s procedural approach also offers lessons to other states.  As
a threshold matter, the scoping plan process, which entails sector-by-sector 
assessments of emissions, existing controls, and future opportunities, provides 
a model for comprehensive and transparent planning.248  That foundation,
coupled with extensive public hearings around the state and opportunities
to submit comments,249 allows all stakeholders, environmental justice and
otherwise, the opportunity to provide meaningful feedback. 
Given the greater participation challenges that marginalized disadvantaged 
communities face due to a lack of time and resources for research and lobbying, 
a lack of technical expertise in comparison with industrial commenters, and 
language barriers, California’s specific procedural mechanisms to enhance
environmental justice participation have been important.250  Although the
Environmental Justice Advisory Committee may be frustrated that many
of its recommendations have not been adopted, the Committee has provided 
a platform to systematically assess CARB’s steps, gather members of the 
environmental justice community, interact with agency staff, and include 
environmental justice concerns on the CARB website and in CARB
proceedings.  Requirements to hold public hearings in environmental
justice communities facilitate access for residents without the time and
resources to travel to Sacramento and further extend participatory opportunities 
to marginalized communities.  As one environmental justice advocate stated, 
“[e]nvironmental justice groups are advocating for a democratization of
policymaking” and “‘[w]e must move from a small cabal of folks determining 
a path for California’s climate policies to the broad base of California’s
Programs, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/iqap/ [https://perma.cc/F3QQ-H6G6] (last visited Dec. 16, 
2017).
248. See, e.g., NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10 (revealing the state’s 
sector-by-sector carbon reduction plans). 
249. See id. at 6 (providing overview of public outreach); Cal. Air Res. Bd., AB 32
Scoping Plan Events (archiving public workshops on the Scoping Plan), https://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/meetings/meetings.htm [https://perma.cc/L5WK-84Y8] (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2018).
250. In addition to the programs re-capped here, A.B. 398, the cap-and-trade extension
bill, included a requirement that the new Compliance Offsets Protocol Task Force include 
environmental justice representatives (and many other stakeholders). See Cal. A.B. 398, 
at sec 7 (2017) (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE sec. 38591.1(a)).
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electorate being engaged and providing solutions for California’s climate 
policy future.’”251 
Participation does not, of course, guarantee influence.  The addition of
two members with environmental justice experience to the Air Resources
Board could, however, increase the environmental justice voice in the
decision making process.  Given the complexities of the issues California 
confronts, there is no assurance that environmental justice proposals will
suddenly hold sway.  Nonetheless, the state’s procedural mechanisms have
provided opportunities to amplify voices that, due to the marginalized nature
of the communities at stake, have often been little heard. 
B. Economic and Political Constraints: Less Direction for Industry 
Integrating environmental justice has, however, been constrained by
economic and political forces, constraints most evident in the state’s treatment
of industry emissions.  Looking to the future, as the state works to meet 
its 2030 target, the 2030 Scoping Plan indicates the state’s current intent 
to continue to rely primarily on cap-and-trade in the industrial sector, 
leaving other potential options for future development.252  More substantive
proposals, including measures to reduce fossil fuel use, are described as
“potential additional actions” that could be explored “in the years following 
finalization of the Scoping Plan.”253  It is unclear if and when CARB would 
adopt more substantive measures. 
1. Political, Environmental, and Economic Factors 
Impacting Industry Strategies 
California’s reluctance to impose fewer direct expectations on industry 
is likely driven by economic, leakage, and political factors.  Although the 
state anticipates economic benefits from transitioning to clean energy as 
251. Debra Kahn, Environmental justice: From the margins to the mainstream, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 2016). 
252. See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 72–73. The state will 
continue to rely on a couple of direct industrial measures: controls on high-global warming
gases used in refrigeration and high-technology operations, as well as recently-adopted
controls on oil and gas distribution and storage. See id. at 72. Otherwise, the Scoping Plan 
states only that ARB will “[c]ontinue and strategically expand research and development 
efforts to identify, evaluate, and help deploy innovative strategies that reduce GHG emissions
in the industrial sector.” Id.
253. Id. at 73. 
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California leads the way in green technology development and new
employment opportunities in renewables and efficiency,254 direct requirements
on existing industry could have negative economic impacts on regulated
facilities, with potential spillover effects on the state’s economy.255 The
cap-and-trade program promotes the most cost-effective reductions, since
companies facing higher costs can purchase allowances rather than reduce 
emissions themselves.  And the availability of offsets, the decision to continue 
to allocate many allowances to industry for free, and AB 398’s new cost 
containment measures represent additional signs of concern about the
potential economic impact of GHG restrictions on industry.256 
From an environmental perspective, direct requirements on industry
could cause emissions leakage: they could push industry to move production
elsewhere, by reducing or eliminating California ventures.257  Although
that would reduce co-pollutant emissions in California, it would lead to 
the worst of all worlds from a GHG perspective: California would suffer 
an economic loss with no concomitant GHG emissions benefit, since the
GHG emissions would continue elsewhere.258 
In some cases, “politics” appears to be playing a role, one most evident 
in AB 398’s explicit restriction on CARB’s ability to adopt any further
GHG limits on refineries or oil and gas production, aside from methane 
254. See generally id. at 50 (describing anticipated economic benefits generally). 
The Scoping Plan’s economic analysis does not take anticipated benefits from new industry
into account. See id. at 50, 55. Even so, the economic analysis demonstrates only a slight 
impact on economic growth in the state. See id. at 50. 
255. See Melanie Mason & Chris Megerian, Bipartisan Votes Extend Cap and Trade 
to 2030, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california­
climate-change-vote-republicans-20170717-story.html [https://perma.cc/R4WG-3CMX]
(observing that industry viewed the cap-and-trade program “as less costly for their bottom
line than other direct regulations that have been considered to reach the 2030 goal”). See also
The Climate v. Local Pollution, supra note 88 (observing that cap-and-trade provides a cheaper
mechanism for controlling emissions and that cap-and-trade would mean “fewer price 
increases for consumers”). 
256. See Cara Horowitz, California Extends its Cap-and-Trade Program through
2030, LEGAL PLANET BLOG (July 17, 2017), http://legal-planet.org/2017/07/17/california­
extends-its-cap-and-trade-program-through-2030/ [https://perma.cc/N2KK-9688].  These 
measures are not restricted to industry; the electricity sector also benefits from free allowances, 
though revenue derived from the allowances must benefit ratepayers.  17 CAL. CODE REG. 
§ 95892.
257. See Harry Horder, California Carbon Info, Regulatory Roundup: ‘On the Trail’
of ARB’s Pointers: Cap-and-Trade, Direct Regulation, or Carbon Tax? (Nov. 14, 2006), 
http://californiacarbon.info/regulatory-round-up-on-the-trail-of-arbs-pointers-cap-and­
trade-direct-dregulation-or-carbon-tax/ (discussing CARB presentation on options for achieving
2030 target that emphasized how cap-and-trade reduced emissions leakage relative to direct 
regulation).
258. See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 70. 
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and fugitive emissions.259 As noted above, that provision scuttled an earlier 
2017 Draft Scoping Plan’s proposed twenty percent limitation on refinery
emissions by 2030260 and prevents any such future limits. The oil industry
reportedly exerted significant influence in the negotiations.261 
Overall, efforts to directly address emissions from large sources, of
significant concern to environmental justice communities, have proven 
challenging, as the state juggles its interest in improving environmental 
quality with concerns about economic impacts, emissions leakage, and
struggles to build the necessary political coalitions to pass and maintain 
its comprehensive climate program.
Whatever the explanation for the state’s continued reliance on cap-and­
trade in the industrial sector, the state’s approach appears to be in some
tension with AB 197, which indicated that the state should prioritize direct 
reductions at large stationary sources, based on the assumption that direct 
reductions would be more likely to achieve certain GHG reductions and 
259. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  Environmental justice and some
environmental groups said that the “Cap-and-Trade extension was written by the oil industry . . .
and allows refineries to expand indefinitely with no program for Just Transition to clean
energy that is so desperately needed in EJ communities.”  Climate Hawks Vote, Press 
Release: California: Broad Coalition of Environmental Justice, Climate Groups Oppose
Cap-and-Trade Bill (July 13, 2017), http://climatehawksvote.com/news/press-releases/ 
california-broad-coalition-environmental-justice-climate-groups-oppose-cap-trade-bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/WZ87-49GZ].  In the transportation sector, oil industry opposition also 
reportedly doomed a provision to reduce oil consumption by fifty percent by 2030.  See 
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  Diane Takvorian, a member of the 
California Air Resources Board and the head of an environmental justice group, called the 
limitation “a direct attack on ARB’s proposed refinery reduction measures.” Mason, supra
note 88. 
261. See CEJA, Justice Deferred, supra note 238 (asserting that the preemption
provisions were “pushed into the bill by Big Oil”). Patrick McGreevy, writing for the Los 
Angeles Times, reported that the biggest lobbying expenditures for the three-month period 
ending in September, 2017 were the Western States Petroleum Association, at 2.2 million, 
and Chevron, at 1.1 million. See Patrick McGreevy, Oil industry spent millions on lobbying as
California lawmakers debated cap-and-trade extension, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017), http:// 
www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-oil-industry-spent­
millions-on-lobbying-1509645501-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/N5HE-AQZ6]. According 
to McGreevy, Jamie Court, the head of Consumer Watchdog, observed that “‘[t]he oil
companies were the biggest winners in the Legislature this year,’” likely saving “‘tens or 
hundreds of millions’” through their influence on the cap-and-trade bill. Id. “Climate Hawks 
Vote” wrote a press release, joined by 50 climate and environmental justice groups, opposing
AB 398, quoting activists who stated that “[t]he Cap & Trade extension was written by the 
oil industry” and “AB 398 began as a Big Oil wish list, and it hasn’t improved since then.”
Climate Hawks Vote, supra note 259. 
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more broadly distributed co-pollutant benefits than cap-and-trade.262 CARB 
is arguably addressing the “direct reduction” requirement by relying upon
AB 617, the bill requiring intensified monitoring and emission reductions 
of criteria and toxic pollutants, even though that bill does not address 
GHGs.263 
Aside from compliance with AB 197, primary reliance on cap-and-trade 
in the industrial sector generates two issues.  First is the risk that, relative
to other types of sources, industry will disproportionately purchase allowances 
and offsets rather than reducing emissions, depriving neighboring communities 
of co-pollutant benefits.  Second is the degree to which the state’s program
is adequately helping the industrial sector decarbonize. 
2. Industrial Emissions and the “Waterbed” Effect 
The state’s combination of cap-and-trade in the industrial sector with 
more prescriptive measures in other sectors could be causing what is known 
as the “waterbed effect:”264 requirements that push down emissions through 
regulation in some sectors (transportation and electricity) could free up
more allowances, and emissions, in the less regulated sector (industry).265 
Of course, a wide range of factors can influence emissions, including
economic activity, water availability (for hydroelectric), fuel prices, etc. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, as the state’s climate programs took
effect, transportation emissions dropped markedly between 2007 and 2015, 
notwithstanding slight increases in 2014 and 2015,266 and electricity sector 
262. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
263. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at ES 6, ES 15, 14, 71. ARB’s 
originally proposed direct reduction requirements for refineries had been intended to comply
with AB 197, but were scuttled by the preemption provision in AB 398.  See infra note 315 and
accompanying text.
264. See Alice Kaswan, Energy, Governance, and Market Mechanisms, 72 MIAMI L.
REV. 476, 532 (2018) (describing waterbed phenomenon). 
265. More specifically, prescriptive measures have likely driven electricity and
transportation sector emission reductions, and so these sectors have relatively low demand 
for allowances. If allowances are freely available due to low demand from the electricity
and transportation sectors, then they are likely to be inexpensive. Industry, facing few 
direct requirements, could well be tempted to use and purchase inexpensive allowances
rather than invest in reductions.  As a consequence, there may be fewer reductions in the 
industry sector than in the more controlled electricity and transportation sectors.  So, the 
regulatory push on the emissions “waterbed” in the electricity and transportation sectors
could maintain or increase emissions in the less-regulated industrial sector. 
266. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., 2017 Edition: California Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Inventory, supra note 135, at 2 (Figure 3, indicating relative shifts in sectoral emissions). 
In 2007, transportation emissions were 184.41 million tons CO2 equivalent, and decreased 
to 164.63 in 2015. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., California Greenhouse Gas Inventory for 2000-
2015—By Category, supra note 120, at 1. Transportation emissions increased in 2015 relative
to 2014, when they were 160.03 million tons CO2 equivalent. Id. The Inventory Report 
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emissions dropped substantially between 2008 and 2015.267  During that
period, industrial emissions remained flat.268  Although economic growth
during this period means that industrial emissions have likely decreased
relative to output,269 the fact remains that industrial emissions have not
decreased as much as more regulated sectors.  The discrepancy could potentially
be explained by mandatory reductions in the electricity and transportation 
sectors freeing up inexpensive allowances for use in the less regulated 
industrial sector. 
Again, some disadvantaged communities have not seen environmental 
improvements from the cap-and-trade program.270  Further analysis is warranted 
to determine if California’s regulatory scheme is creating a waterbed effect 
that leads to fewer reductions in the industrial sector, and, if so, whether
these industrial emissions are contributing to heavier burdens in disadvantaged 
communities.
3. Pathways to Decarbonization: Challenges for Industry 
CARB’s relative lack of direct industrial measures and reliance on cap­
and-trade—especially if allowances are disproportionately available to 
the industrial sector due to the waterbed effect—could also compromise
progress toward industrial decarbonization.  As alluded to above, experts 
suggests that “population growth, lower fuel prices, and improved economic conditions 
and higher employment rate are potential factors that may increase fuel use.”  Cal. Air Res. Bd.,
2017 Edition: California Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory, supra note 135, at 5. 
267. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., 2017 Edition: California Greenhouse Gas Inventory,
supra note 135, at 2 (Figure 3, indicating relative shifts in sectoral emissions).  Electricity
emissions were 120.14 million tons of CO2 equivalent in 2008 and decreased to 83.67 
million tons of CO2 equivalent in 2015. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., California Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory for 2000-2015—By Category, supra note 120, at 1.  Although 2008 represented
a slight spike in emissions, emission levels have been well over 100 million tons of CO2
since 2000. Id.
 268. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., 2017 Edition: California GHG Inventory, supra note 135, 
at 2 (Figure 3, indicating relative shifts in sectoral emissions) and 8 (indicating flat industrial
emissions).  In 2007 and 2008, industrial emissions were just under 90 million tons of CO2 
equivalent.  In 2015, industrial emissions were 91.71 million tons of CO2 equivalent.  Cal. 
Air Res. Bd., California Greenhouse Gas Inventory for 2000-2015—By Category, supra
note 120, at 1.  CARB noted that refineries and hydrogen production emissions have somewhat
decreased while other industries have increased, reflecting a growing economy. Cal. Air Res.
Bd., 2017 Edition: California Greenhouse Gas Inventory, supra note 135, at 9. 
269. See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 70. 
270. See supra notes 115–34 and accompanying text (describing studies analyzing
the post-cap-and-trade distribution of emissions). 
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increasingly agree that, to avoid catastrophic climate change, emissions 
reductions of at least 80 percent below 1990 levels are necessary by 2050.271 
Although decarbonization is not a uniquely “environmental justice” issue,
environmental justice groups have consistently called for more aggressive 
measures to reduce GHGs and transition to a fossil-fuel-free economy.272 
In addition to a generalized concern about planetary survival, they have 
highlighted that disadvantaged communities are more vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change and that a fossil-fuel-free economy would eliminate
many persistent pollution hot spots.
Although California has not explicitly set a decarbonization goal, Republican
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger promulgated an executive order establishing
a statewide goal of reducing emissions 80 percent below 1990 levels by
2050.273  CARB and local air districts’ planning is, at least to some extent, 
oriented toward the longer-term 2050 goal.274  In the electricity and transportation
sectors, California has begun the process of strategically envisioning a
pathway toward decarbonization.275 
Although the state’s reluctance to impose direct requirements on industry
is understandable, reliance on cap-and-trade may fail to induce industrial 
decarbonization. As CARB noted, most industrial emissions stem from 
combustion, and so reducing, if not eliminating, reliance on fossil fuel 
combustion will be a key strategy for decarbonizing industry.276  To replace
on-site combustion, industry will need to consider on-site renewables or 
transitioning to off-site renewables generation through direct contracts with 
generators or through utilities. California carbon prices have been low,277
 271. See JAMES H. WILLIAMS, ET AL., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 8 (2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ 
US_Deep_Decarbonization_Policy_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU3E-CJ6D]. 
272. See Environmental Justice Advisory Committee, supra note 35 (Clauses 1–6
and 16–17 articulating the environmental and equity drawbacks to relying on fossil fuels
and the necessity of transitioning to cleaner fuels more quickly than is currently occurring).
273. See Executive Order S-3-05, https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=1861 [https://
perma.cc/5UDT-UV76].
274. See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that the Scoping
Plan anticipates efforts needed to achieve the 2050 goal, not just the 2030 goal).
275. The 50 percent RPS by 2030 and aggressive energy efficiency standards are intended
to provide a strong push to facilitate a transition away from fossil fuels in the electricity
sector, and CARB recognizes the need to transition away from fossil-based natural gas.
Id. at 65-69.  In transportation, the Scoping Plan notes that: “It is critical to support and
accelerate progress on transitioning to a zero carbon transportation system.” Id. at 74.  The 
Scoping Plan outlines plans for reducing transportation emissions through renewable fuels,
electrification, land use planning, and other measures, and is considering the cross-sector 
implications of that transition. See id. at 73–81. 
276. See id. at 69, 70. 
277. For example, at the November 2017 allowance auction, the median price per 
ton for current allowances was $14.88, and the mean allowance price was $16.38 (relative 
to the auction reserve price of $13.57/allowance). California Cap-and-Trade program and 
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and though they are likely to increase with a more stringent emissions target, 
it is unclear whether a carbon price will provide industry with sufficient
incentives. In addition, transitioning to fossil-free energy will likely require
adequate transmission and coordination with utilities and other entities, 
coordination that would benefit from governmental facilitation.
The state has recognized the need for careful planning and coordinated 
efforts to decarbonize electricity and transportation.  The same level of
planning, coordination, and support will be needed to decarbonize the industrial
sector. A hands-off approach that waits for industry to make the right decisions, 
prompted by the carbon price, is unlikely to be sufficient; a more affirmative 
state role is likely to be necessary.
As noted above, state officials have selected cap-and-trade for industry 
because of its “cost-effectiveness.”278  Cap-and-trade encourages low-cost 
emission reducers to do the reducing (so they can sell extra allowances)
and lets those facing high emission reduction costs purchase allowances
and offsets, thus lowering the overall cost of achieving a given reduction.279 
That may work when incremental change is needed; when some can continue
to pollute as long as others cut back.  But decarbonization will require 
across-the-board shifts, from high- as well as low-cost reducers.  Delaying 
change for higher-cost reducers will not necessarily represent the wisest
or most effective decarbonization strategy.280 
Quebec Cap-and-Trade System November 2017 Joint Auction #13, Summary Results
Report (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/nov-2017/summary_ 
results_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7VV-X3QY].  In comparison, a recent international 
economic analysis of the carbon prices necessary to induce dramatic emission reductions
estimated that a price of US $40–80 per ton would be necessary by 2020.  CARBON PRICING




278. See NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 71. On the importance of 
cost-effectiveness in climate strategies, see generally Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective
Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 
229 (2013).
279. See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10094 (2003). 
280. See WILLIAMS, ET AL, supra note 271, at 81, 82 (observing that initiating only
low-cost measures could impede the long-term path to decarbonization); Benjamin Görlach, 
Emissions Trading in the Climate Policy Mix: Understanding and Managing Interactions 
with Other Policy Instruments, 25 ENERGY &ENV’T 735, 743 (2014); see also Kaswan, Energy, 
Governance, and Market Mechanisms, supra note 264, at 528–30. 
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A desire for “cost-effective” reductions thus does not provide a reason
to refrain from pursuing industrial reductions more directly.  Of course, 
the state cannot ignore the potential risks associated with aggressive action, 
like economic harm and leakage.  Supportive strategies that provide incentives, 
direct financial resources, technical assistance, and strategic investments
in accessible renewables and appropriate transmission will likely all be 
needed to effectively decarbonize the industrial sector.  While electrification 
of industry is unlikely to eliminate all co-pollutant emissions, particularly 
from production processes, a more direct effort to envision and facilitate 
industrial sector decarbonization would nonetheless help California realize
the co-pollutant reductions it had hoped would follow from its GHG controls. 
The challenges facing industrial controls raise larger questions, and
ones that are largely beyond the scope of this essay.  One is the difficulty
states face when they go it alone: California controls on industry risk
leakage, and the associated failure to reduce GHG emissions, when other
states do not impose similar restrictions.  States do not want to incur the
economic consequences of industry controls if those controls will only 
lead to shifts, rather than reductions, in GHG emissions.  As a result, states, 
including California, may be reluctant to take necessary actions unless and
until we have federal, if not international, controls that reduce the risk that
industry will simply move elsewhere.281 
Another critical issue is the role of direct regulatory controls within
a cap-and-trade system, a topic I have developed in a recent article, Energy,
Governance, and Market Mechanisms.282  There I suggest that market-based
mechanisms have an important role to play in climate governance, but that
they are best seen as a complement to more direct measures.  Because
decarbonization requires careful strategies building a long-term trajectory
toward a fossil-fuel-free future, market signals facilitating one-off individual 
industry decisions are unlikely to trigger the necessary change.  Direct and 
deliberate planning, coordination, and support will also be necessary. 
C. Emerging Retrenchment on a Multipollutant Approach? Or Not?
Although one of the hallmarks of California’s approach to climate change 
has been its multipollutant goals of achieving both GHG and co-pollutant 
reductions,283 that integration has faced recent challenges.  Prominent scholars
have argued that local pollution should be addressed separately from greenhouse 
gases. While recognizing communities’ frustration with continuing cumulative 
281. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007). 
282. See supra note 264. 
283. See supra notes 207–37 and accompanying text. 
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pollution burdens and arguing that they should be addressed more aggressively, 
Severin Borenstein, of UC Berkeley’s Haas Energy Institute, states that
“we should not count on, or expect, GHG policies to control local pollution 
emissions. We should pursue separate policies to reduce those local 
pollutants.”284  One reporter has commented that “[p]rivately, some
mainstream environmentalists and state regulators express frustration with 
environmental justice groups, saying that the state’s climate policies are not 
the right venue to address problems related to conventional pollution.”285 
The progression of bills to address the extension of cap-and-trade
reflected this tension.  Lawmakers rejected AB 378, which extended cap­
and-trade but included limits on trading in burdened communities.  Instead, the
winning legislative package extended the GHG cap-and-trade program in
one bill (AB 398),286 and laid out a pathway for reducing pollution in
communities suffering from cumulative burdens in another (AB 617).287 
Although the two were related in the sense that support for one was likely
essential to obtain support for the other, the bills treated the pathways to 
achieving environmental progress separately.288 
And CARB appeared to at least partially embrace the idea of separate
pathways for GHGs and co-pollutants in the “industry” section of the
 284. Severin Borenstein, Fight Both Local and Global Pollution, But Separately,
ENERGY INSTITUTE BLOG (Jan. 17, 2017), https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2017/01/ 
17/fight-local-and-global-pollution-but-separately/ [https://perma.cc/PJ9X-H3YT]; see also 
Meredith Fowlie, Is Cap and Trade Failing Low Income and Minority Communities?,
ENERGY INSTITUTE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2016), https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2016/10/10/is­
cap-and-trade-failing-low-income-and-minority-communities/ [https://perma.cc/6PX7-KQDB]
(suggesting that exposures to local emissions should be addressed by “strengthening regulations
of local pollutants” rather than “distorting climate change policy”).
285. Kahn, supra note 251. 
286. See supra notes 172–85 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text. 
288. It should be noted that one possible explanation for the bifurcation is that
lawmakers were seeking a two-thirds vote for the cap-and-trade extension to insulate it 
from legal challenge, and could not obtain the two-thirds vote with the co-pollutant
provisions included.  California law requires a two-thirds vote for all taxes, and some have 
argued that the costs associated with the cap-and-trade program constitute a tax.  Although 
this argument has failed in California courts to date, see supra note 144, the state has sought the
two-thirds vote to avoid any future litigation threats.
In addition, the separate legislative tracks in the 2017 legislative session were more
significant than the separate tracks in the 2016 session.  Although the 2016 legislative package 
also featured bifurcated bills, the distinct environmental justice bill, AB 197, affected the 
operation of the GHG program, rather than establishing a separate track for co-pollutants.
In the 2017 bills, in contrast, AB 617, the local pollution bill, does not mention the operation of
the GHG control program. 
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November 2017 scoping plan. CARB notes its agreement with the EJAC 
that “more can and should be done to reduce emissions of criteria pollutants 
and toxic air contaminants.”289  However, the agency states that “[s]tate
and local agencies must evaluate and implement additional measures that 
directly regulate and reduce emissions of criteria and toxic air pollutants 
through other programs.”290 The agency appears to justify this approach
by noting “there is not always a direct correlation between emissions of 
GHGs, criteria pollutants, and toxic air contaminants.”291 
Nonetheless, there are many indications that, notwithstanding CARB’s 
and the legislature’s reluctance to integrate multiple pollutant concerns
into the cap-and-trade program, CARB is not relinquishing its commitment
to a multi-pollutant approach as part of its overall GHG strategy.  In 
general terms, the November 2017 Scoping Plan observes that “[t]he State’s
climate goals require a comprehensive approach . . . [and that] existing efforts . . . 
can complement each other while providing multiple environmental benefits, 
including air quality and climate benefits.”292  The plan further states that
“collective consideration of these efforts illuminates the synergies and
conflicts between policies.”293 There is little question that an integrated
approach will continue in the transportation sector; many of the state’s 
transportation GHG programs grew out of and extended existing air quality 
programs.294 
While the Scoping Plan embraces a multipollutant approach generally 
and in its transportation proposals, the primary controversy has centered
around certain multipollutant approaches for stationary sources, particularly 
in the industrial sector.  In addition to suggesting that GHG and co-pollutant 
emissions are not correlated,295 scholars, and CARB, have been concerned
that direct facility GHG limits or trading restrictions intended to simultaneously 
reduce co-pollutants from large sources will lead to leakage: that they will 
simply shift GHG emissions to other facilities, likely out-of-state, rather 
than reducing net GHG emissions.296
 289. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 71. 
290. Id.  It is not clear whether, by “other programs” the agency means non-GHG programs, 
or, more narrowly, means only non-cap-and-trade programs (which could include GHG 
programs that take co-pollutants into account).
indirect. The November 2017 Scoping Plan states that relocation of emissions outside of
 291. Id.
 292. Id. at 12–13. 




See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
See Borenstein, supra note 284. CARB’s reference to this concern is somewhat
the state would fail to achieve desired reductions and would have adverse economic impacts; 
the text does not state, but implies, that control mechanisms that would shift emissions out
of state should be avoided.  NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 70. 
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However, concerns about the desirability of these particular reduction 
strategies—facility caps, or trading limits—do not justify relinquishing a 
multi-pollutant approach.  If caps or trading limits would lead to substantial 
leakage,297 then, under a multipollutant approach, that option would be
undesirable due to its failure to address GHG emissions, even if they would
succeed at reducing co-pollutants. Thus, concerns about particular regulatory 
strategies, like emissions caps or trading restrictions motivated by co-
pollutant aspirations, may be subject to the charge that they will fail to reduce
GHGs emissions due to leakage, but that does not justify relinquishing 
multipollutant analysis. 
And if GHG and co-pollutant emissions were not correlated, that would 
be a second reason to reject such limits on the merits. The degree of
correlation does not provide a reason for or against taking a multipollutant 
approach. If emissions are not correlated, then a multipollutant approach
facilitates consideration of potential tradeoffs.  If they are correlated, then
the same controls can achieve multiple benefits. 
And, ultimately, notwithstanding some language expressing doubts about 
a multipollutant approach for stationary sources, the Scoping Plan’s industry 
section simultaneously recognizes that most GHG emissions result from 
combustion, that GHG and co-pollutant emissions are correlated, and that 
industrial controls will lead to shared multi-pollutant benefits. CARB states 
that industry emissions 
“are mainly due to fuel combustion . . .[,]” and . . . [m]oving toward a cleaner 
economy . . . requires us to address GHG emissions in this sector, which has the 
potential to provide local co-benefits in criteria pollutant and toxic air contaminant
reductions in immediate surrounding locations, especially in vulnerable 
communities.298 
CARB further notes that, as the industrial “sector is dominated by combustion- 
related emissions, policies and measures to supply cleaner fuels and more 
efficient technology are the key to reducing GHG emissions.”299 The agency
specifies that “[t]he predominant paths to reducing GHG emissions for the 
Industrial sector are: fuel switching, energy efficiency improvements, and 
297. I assume for the sake of argument that these approaches would lead to leakage 
that would undermine the GHG reduction program, without resolving that contested question.
298. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 69. Studies indicate that
industries vary in the degree of correlation. See BOYCE & PASTOR, supra note 10 (analyzing
co-pollutant intensity variations in numerous industries).  Their study found a high degree 
of correlation for refineries, and less correlation for power plants. 
299. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 70. 
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process modifications[,]” all measures likely to reduce both GHG and co-
pollutant emissions.300 
In its goals for the industrial sector, the agency continues to list its intent 
to “[m]aximize air quality co-benefits.”301 And, under “potential additional 
actions” to be explored, the agency lists increasing renewables and, consistent 
with AB 617, partnering “with California’s local air districts to effectively 
use BARCT to achieve air quality and GHG reduction co-benefits at large 
industrial facilities.”302 
The multipollutant character of California’s climate policies continues 
to be one of its defining and most valuable features. While some may
have concerns about the desirability or efficacy of integrating co-pollutant 
measures into specific GHG control strategies like cap-and-trade, those 
concerns should not derail California’s larger multipollutant agenda.
And, taken as a whole, and notwithstanding some conflicting language, 
the Scoping Plan appears to have retained its multipollutant focus, a focus 
that is likely to be more effective and efficient than measures that treat
each aspect of that transition in isolation. 
D. Growing Industrial Pushback: Preemption
AB 398’s preemption provisions were highly controversial.  As noted
above, the law featured two forms of preemption: (1) preemption of all
local controls on stationary sources under the cap-and-trade program (but 
preserving CARB authority to impose controls on these sources); and (2) 
preemption of all future direct controls on oil and gas refineries, production
and storage, whether at the local or state level.303  The preemption provisions
reveal the power of industry groups to trade their approval (and influence 
over members of the state legislature) for preemption of state and local 
controls on their industries. 
300. Id. And, before AB 398 precluded direct controls on refinery emissions, CARB’s 
January 2017 scoping plan had included efficiency improvements that would lead to a 20
percent reduction in refinery GHG emissions. CARB had planned to “partner with California’s
local air districts, which traditionally permit these facilities for criteria pollutants and toxic
air contaminants.” CAL. AIR RESC. BD., THE 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN UPDATE
(Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter JAN. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE], https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
scopingplan/2030sp_pp_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8Y8-TEE9].  CARB had anticipated
that these measures would not only reduce GHGs, they would also lead to reductions in 
traditional pollution, benefitting “some of the most polluted and disadvantaged communities in
the State.” JAN. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra, at 38. 
301. NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at 72. 
302. Id. at 73. 
303. See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
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1. Preemption of Local Stationary Source Controls 
The preemption of local GHG controls on all stationary sources could 
have implications for the local multipollutant control efforts discussed
above.304  For example, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District
(the District) has developed a Refinery Emissions Reduction Strategy that 
contains measures designed to reduce all three types of refinery emissions:
criteria air pollutants, toxics, and GHGs, and which contemplated setting 
direct GHG limits.305  Because Bay Area refineries generate seventy percent 
of the region’s stationary source GHG emissions,306 local action could
have had a significant impact. A District policy advisor reportedly stated
that the new preemption provisions are “‘specifically designed to prevent
the adoption of progressive, tough air quality regulations by agencies like 
the Bay Area air district against refineries[.]’”307 
Additionally, the District has a “basin-wide combustion strategy” that 
would “prioritize sources based on the magnitude of their emissions, analyze
the efficiency of combustion processes, and optimize energy-efficiency of 
production processes,” a strategy that inevitably implicates all types of
combustion-related emissions.308 To address methane emissions from
multiple sources, the District has a “Basin-Wide Methane Strategy” focused 
on quantifying and reducing both methane and co-pollutants from all
sources through a coordinated strategy.309 The preemption provisions will 
prevent the District from effectively developing and implementing these
multipollutant strategies.
Given local preemption, the local districts will have to rely on the state 
to impose specific controls, since only the state retains the power to impose
direct controls (except in the refinery sector, where state as well as local 
direct controls are preempted, as discussed below).  As local air districts 
304. See supra notes 228–37 and accompanying text. 
305. BAAQMD, supra note 228, at 5/3. The District was considering a “Petroleum 
Refining Climate Impacts Limit” that would limit the carbon intensity for each refinery,
effectively imposing an energy efficiency standard. Id. at 5/6. 
306. Id. at 5/3.
307. Mason et al., supra note 255. Environmental justice advocates note that the 
preemption “is a direct attack on a years’ long organizing effort in the Bay Area to win a 
cap on refinery emissions False [L]ocal air districts can no longer be more proactive in
addressing climate change False” California Environmental Justice Alliance, Justice Deferred, 
supra note 238. 
308. BAAQMD, supra note 228, at 5/4. 
309. Id. 
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continue to develop co-pollutant reduction strategies under existing law 
and under AB 617’s programs for reducing cumulative burdens, both co-
pollutant and GHG reductions will undoubtedly be implicated.  Rather 
than developing integrated strategies on their own, however, local air districts
will have to rely on the state to develop applicable stationary source controls. 
It is worth noting that the preemption of local control efforts seen in AB 
398 is not an isolated compromise; it is part of a trend in state environmental 
policies. States increasingly preclude local governments from addressing
local environmental conditions.310  The trend is facilitated by groups like
the American Legislative Exchange Council, an organization that promotes 
free markets and that has helped states adopt policies to limit a wide array
of local regulations.311  Moreover, AB 398’s preemption of local action had 
recent precedent in California. A 2017 bill to increase the gas tax to fund 
road repairs and public transit included a general statewide preemption of 
truck emission requirements that effectively precludes local air district 
measures designed to control localized pollution.312  Although GHG emissions
have global, not local, effects, AB 398 could nonetheless frustrate local 
governments’ strong local commitments to addressing climate change.313
 310. See, e.g., Uma Outka, Instrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 
COLO. L. REV. 927 (2015). 
311. See American Legislative Exchange Council, https://www.alec.org/about/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2017). Commentators suggest that ALEC has been instrumental in facilitating
state preemption of local regulation. See Henry Grabar, The Shackling of the American
City, SLATE.COM (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/ 
09/how_alec_acce_and_pre_emptions_laws_are_gutting_the_powers_of_american_cities.html
[https://perma.cc/R87S-HXU3]; see also Michele Swenson, Preemption of Democracy by
ALEC, its Corporate Funders, and Republican & Democratic Corporatists, HUFFPOST
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-swenson/preemption-of-democracy-b
_b_9206274.html [https://perma.cc/67WR-WG4F].
312. Cal. Legislative Info., SB-1 Transportation Funding, sec. 18 (2017) (adding sec.
43021(a) to the California Health & Safety Code); see Patrick McGreevy, Environmentalists 
oppose Gov. Brown’s transportation plan for giving truckers a break on future pollution
rules, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-transportation- 
plan-opposition-20170331-story.html [https://perma.cc/JD8P-AZCR]. The bill required the
San Pedro ports, including Los Angeles and Long Beach, among the biggest polluters in
the South Coast, to eliminate provisions intended to accelerate truck pollution controls. 
The San Pedro Bay Clean Air Action, which covers the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,
had included provisions to accelerate the implementation of future state truck controls, but, with
the preemption of new state controls, the district has turned to mechanisms to encourage
and incentivize (rather than require) accelerated reductions.  See SAN PEDRO BAY PORTS,
supra note 225, at 7–8. 
313. See William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 
3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 261, 270–71, 280–81; see also Kirsten H. Engel & Barak 
Orbach, Micro Motives for State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 119 (2008); see also Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for 
Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV.
L. REV. 791, 798–99 (2008). 
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2. Preemption of All Controls on Refineries and the 
Oil and Gas Sector 
AB 398’s preemption of not only local, but also CARB controls on
refineries and other oil and gas operations is significantly more restrictive 
than the preemption of local controls on stationary sources.314  As noted
above, prior to AB 398, CARB’s primary proposed direct industry reduction 
requirement—and a key part of its plan to comply with AB 197’s admonition
to prioritize direct reductions—had been refinery requirements anticipated to
achieve a 20 percent reduction in emissions.315  The preemption provision
has been viewed as a mechanism for stopping CARB’s proposal and 
preventing any future proposals.316  In the refinery and oil and gas sectors, 
the provision also blocks CARB from fulfilling AB 197’s admonition to 
prioritize direct emissions controls.317  Preempting direct controls on refineries
has significant climate and co-pollutant implications. 
From an environmental justice perspective, refineries are disproportionately 
located in disadvantaged communities.318  Recent analysis by the state Office
of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment indicates that 65 percent of 
California’s refineries are within disadvantaged communities, while 85 percent 
are within 1 mile of a disadvantaged community.  Communities hosting the 
state’s refineries have long fought for additional environmental protections,319 
and, as discussed above, have been disappointed that the state’s cap-and­
314. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
315. JAN. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra note 300, at 38–39. 
316. See Mason, et al., supra note 255 (quoting a CARB Board member’s assertion 
that the provision is “‘a direct attack on ARB’s proposed refinery reduction measures’”). 
CARB commented on its removal of the refinery measure due to AB 398 in its interim October
2017 scoping plan update. CAL. AIR RESC. BD., THE 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN
42 (Oct. 2017) (noting removal of the refinery measure and the need for increased reliance 
on cap-and-trade), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/revised2017spu.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5CKT-CYMH]. See also California Environmental Justice Alliance, Justice Deferred,
supra note 238 (noting that the preemption provision “will overturn a measure ARB has 
proposed as the main focus of its AB 197 implementation”).
317. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. In the January draft scoping plan, 
ARB noted that “this refinery measure prioritizes direct GHG reductions at large stationary
sources pursuant to AB 197.”  JAN. SCOPING PLAN UPDATE, supra note 300, at 38. 
318. See OEHHA, supra note 7, at 16 (Table 4). 
319.  See e.g., Richmond: CBE Advocates For A Just Transition From Fossil Fuels To
Building A New Healthier And Thriving Economy, COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, 
http://www.cbecal.org/organizing/northern-california/richmond/ [https://perma.cc/442M­
VKFZ] (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) (describing campaign to address Richmond’s refinery
emissions). 
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trade program has not brought more widespread local emission reductions.320 
AB 398 prevents CARB from imposing direct GHG limits that might 
affirmatively shape permissible emissions, instead letting refineries make
their own choices in light of the cap-and-trade program’s price signal. 
Of course, over the next few years, AB 617 will establish a monitoring 
program that is intended to lead to state and community-based emission
reduction strategies that could begin to address toxic and criteria pollutants
from refineries, as well as accelerate any retrofit requirements that may
remain undone.321 It remains to be seen whether the addition of one tool 
will outweigh the loss of another. 




Appealing to environmental justice concerns—concerns about day-to­
day pollution in areas experiencing unhealthy air as well as concerns about 
access to the economic benefits of a clean energy transition—proved 
critical to the success of California climate policy.  As one lawmaker stated, 
“framing environmental issues as an environmental justice and equity
issues . . . really won the day when it came to S.B. 32 [the 2030 climate target 
bill].”322 
For states struggling to build support for climate legislation, can California’s 
integration of environmental justice considerations provide a model that 
other jurisdictions could build upon?323  Some might wonder whether 
California, with a powerful legislative block committed to improving conditions
in disadvantaged communities, has had a unique political alignment that 
other states cannot hope to replicate. 
320. See Emily Guerin, Is California climate law worsening pollution in communities of
color?, KPCC RADIO (Feb. 2, 2017) (describing Wilmington, California residents’ frustration 
with continuing emissions from local refineries and other sources), http://www.scpr.org/ 
news/2017/02/02/68616/is-california-climate-law-worsening-pollution-in-c/ [https://perma.cc/
J7MW-EWH3].
321. See supra notes 187–94 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that AB 617
calls for accelerated implementation of Best Available Retrofit Control Technology, Cal. 
Legislative Info., AB-617 Nonvehicular Air Pollution: Criteria Air Pollutants and Toxic 
Air Contaminants, sec. 2 (2017) (amending sec. 40920.6 to the California Health & Safety
Code). CARB’s January 2017 scoping plan had suggested that the state would achieve its
planned direct refinery reductions through the BARCT process, where applicable.  JAN. SCOPING 
PLAN UPDATE, supra note 300, at 38–39.  Although AB 398 has prevented ARB from carrying
through with its refinery measures, it remains to be seen whether the AB 617 process will 
lead to a similar outcome.
 322. See Kahn, supra note 251. 
323. As noted at the beginning of this Article, the November 2017 Scoping Plan states
that: “California’s environmental justice and equity movement is establishing a blueprint 
for the nation and world.”  NOVEMBER 2017 SCOPING PLAN, supra note 10, at ES 6. 
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There is little question that numerous factors aligned to enable California
to adopt aggressive climate laws and integrate environmental and social 
justice considerations into the state’s policies.  Given the intensity of the 
state’s concentrated air pollution, wide gaps between the haves and have 
nots, and a substantial political block of liberal representatives from
disadvantaged communities, environmental justice proved a winning theme 
in California. 
Even if other states face different political alignments, however, they
could learn from California’s approach to building political will for climate 
action, both in the short term and looking ahead to decarbonization
trajectories. Rather than viewing climate action as a narrow question
focused solely on greenhouse gas reductions, the state has recognized the 
larger socioeconomic and environmental issues at stake in a transition to 
a clean economy, and that recognition played a crucial role in building 
political will.324 
Focusing solely on GHGs is likely to trigger political resistance from 
the vested interests most directly impacted, while failing to garner deep 
public support due to the diffuse, indirect, and speculative nature of climate
impacts and public fears about the potential economic impacts of climate 
mitigation efforts. The larger idea behind California’s success—connecting 
climate action to bread and butter issues like air quality, access to employment
for those who are un- or under-employed, and appealing to the public’s
moral sense that change is necessary and inevitable, could expand support 
for climate action.325 
In other states facing different challenges, environmental justice might
not be the galvanizing issue.  In other states, for example, different socioeconomic
considerations, like employment opportunities for marginalized workers, 
could prove pivotal. The more that climate action is linked to a larger 
vision contemplating a just and sustainable transition, however, the greater
the likelihood of citizen support.
324. Professor John Dernbach has similarly argued that a “sustainable development” 
vision is critical to building political will for decarbonization strategies.  See John C. Dernbach. 
Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization: Lessons from California and Germany, 82 BROOK.
L. REV. 825, 867–70 (2017). Although the term evolved out of international environmental 
law, recognizing the developing world’s need for development and the necessity of developing
sustainably, the term is equally applicable to the environment/economy tensions sometimes
encountered in domestic environmental law.  Sustainable development in the domestic context
couples economic, social, and environmental considerations. 
325. See BOYCE & PASTOR, supra note 10, at vii; Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice 
and Environmental Law, FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 168–73 (2013). 
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Of course, vested fossil-fuel interests and others reliant on fossil fuels
will continue to resist deep climate action; their business model is on the 
line. But by building coalitions capable of achieving change independent 
of these interests, the resistance of fossil-fuel interests may pale in the face
of calls for action.  As renewable energy and other green companies continue
to gain steam, voices of the new economy may begin to drown out the
dominance of those from the old.326  Whether or not framed as a question
of “environmental justice,” a larger and more comprehensive vision for a
cleaner and greener economy could facilitate the political movement for 
a clean energy transition. 
326. See Jonas Meckling, et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCI. 1170 
(2015); David Roberts, 5 reasons there’s more to climate policy than a price on carbon,
VOX (June 28, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/28/12045860/carbon-tax [https://perma.cc/ 
L8AA-A7QT].
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